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This study proposes a theory of naval strategic planning
for programming. It identifies and describes those factors
which should influence how the Navy determines future force
requirements and eventual capabilities. The work is premised
upon the following hypothesis: Within the context of
national military strategy, naval long-range planning for
future forces should be based on an in-depth understanding
of three factors: (1) the future role of the sea in national
military strategy; (2) the missions naval forces will be
required to perform; and (3) future trends in naval warfare.
The first task of planning is to guide the organization into
an uncertain future. It must identify those factors which
can be used to determine future requirements. The resultant
force concepts can then be developed as required by the
organization's overall needs. Strategic planning in first
and foremost a frame of mind for conceptualizing those
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I. STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR FUTURE NAVAL FORCES
A. INTRODUCTION
The conclusion that the sailor has not always been able
to explain too clearly is that, no matter what single
situation is taken up for discussion be it great or
small, nuclear or non-nuclear, it is not adeguate to
assess the usefulness of naval power in terms of that
one situation. 1
Rear Admiral Wylie describes a characteristic of navies
that has placed the U.S. Navy at a distinct disadvantage in
the annual budget debates. The overall worth of a navy
cannot be accurately gauged by a fixed-scenario projection
of a future global war or other single-criterion method of
analysis. A second characteristic compounds the problem.
At face value, power projection capable navies are more
expensive to procure, operate and maintain than other
forces. Given the choice, naval officials would prefer to
justify the procurement of expensive assets in terms that
favorably demonstrate total naval capability.
A traditional procurement approach has been to
articulate the multiple diplomatic, policing and military
roles navies perform in support of national policy. 2
Reguests were justified by noting the Navy's ability to
provide a wide range of capability across the conflict
spectrum from peace to crisis to war. 3 Moreover, it was
argued that the longevity of naval assets made them a
prudent investment.
1J.C. Wylie, "Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings , August 1957, p. 817.
2 See Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force
Without War: JU.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978) and updated
version by Philip Zelikon, Journal of Strategic Studies
.
March 1984\
3See Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy , Chapter 1
for an excellent description of the multiple functions naval
forces perform.
Increasingly, however, the force planning debate has
centered around the multiple assumption, NATO-Warsaw Pact
conflict in central Europe. 4 This approach is thought to
provide a force-sizing estimate of total U.S. military-
capability in a very demanding scenario. Moreover, it is
generally believed that a force capable of responding to a
NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict would be able to handle lesser
contingencies. The procedure is well established and
unlikely to change significantly in the future. Undoubtedly,
at least part of the rationale behind the Maritime Strategy
was to address the scenario issue head on, in terms
favorable to the Navy.
One of the central premises of this study is an
extension of Admiral Wylie's statement. Not only is it
inadequate to "assess the usefulness of naval power" by any
one situation or criterion, it also is unwise to plan the
procurement of future forces that way. Single issue
approaches are not suitable for long range naval force
planning. They are short-to-mid range (3-7 years)
procedures. Their purpose is to test acceptability as units
are about to be introduced into active service. The single
issue method does not adequately address the ten to 25 year
period that is the concern of long-range strategic planning.
The Navy should not permit short term budgeting
pressures to subvert its long range vision. It must
distinguish between measures required to sell a program and
those that led to its development in the first place. This
study concentrates on the latter issue.
4See Conqressional Research Service reports Plannin
Navy, 1987.
B. HYPOTHESIS
The purpose of this study is to propose a theory of
naval strategic planning for programming. It is concerned
with identifying and describing those factors which
influence future naval force requirements and eventual
capabilities. The central question under consideration is:
How should the navy plan for its long range future?
Specifically, the work will frame the force planning problem
in terms of the operational environment the Navy is likely
to encounter in the future. The following hypothesis is
proposed:
Within the context of national military strategy, naval
long range planning for future forces should be based on
an in-depth understanding of three factors: (1) the
future role of the sea in national military strategy;
(2) the missions forces will be required to perform; and
future trends in naval warfare.
The term "theory" is used in the Clausewitzian sense.
Specifically, theory is a construct employed "to clarify
concepts and ideas that have been, as it were, confused and
entangled." 5 The purpose of theory is to facilitate clear
thinking on a given problem. It will not spew forth simple
answers to complex issues. Rather, good theory begets sound
analysis because it helps the decision-maker frame the
problem in its totality.
The long range naval force planning problem can be
expressed in terms of answers to three general questions.
* WHAT WILL BE THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE SEA IN NATIONAL
MILITARY STRATEGY? This concerns the strategic context
within which the Navy will operate. Of interest is the
relationship between sea power and the future. This
relationship defines why the U.S. requires a Navy and
its future role in national military strategy.
5Carl von Clausewitz, On War , ed. Peter Paret and




* WHAT ARE THE MISSIONS THAT THE NAVY MUST
ACCOMPLISH? National strategy determines missions.
Missions, in turn, determine operational objectives.
Objectives influence employment strategies. A broad-
based understanding of what these missions entail, why
they are important and how they are interrelated is
vital to the planner. Faulty assumptions about naval
missions may result in irrational force structure
decisions.
* WHAT ARE THE BROAD TRENDS IN NAVAL WARFARE? This
question concerns the future nature of naval warfare.
Although this is a complex and diverse issue, it is
possible to identify some general trends. Naval
engagements can be described by certain processes. The
important characteristics of fleet actions can be
analyzed in terms of the processes. The analysis reveals
promising avenues for future research and development.
The overall objective of the study is to construct a
conceptual model of the naval strategic planning problem.
The utility of the model is that it provides a framework for
envisioning future force requirements. It is based on the
fundamental assumption that force requirements should be
derived primarily from two sources: projected mission
requirements and trends in naval warfare.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is necessary to
address two additional issues. The first is the concept of
"strategic planning." The discussion follows the planning
process from the national level—beginning with broad
interests and objectives—down to the level of the
individual services. Strategic planning at each level is
briefly examined. An operational definition for the
purposes of this study is proposed. Second is an overview
of several single-issue approaches to defense planning.
Analysis of their strengths and weaknesses reveals that
differing assumptions lead to alternative solutions to the
planning problem. The section concludes with consideration
of the assumptions that underlie this study.
C. STRATEGIC PLANNING
1. Strategy
Strategy is a broad and unwieldy field of study. In
order to arrive at a workable definition of naval strategic
planning, it is necessary to begin with the general and then
narrow the focus. Strategy, in the broadest sense, is a
"plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a
purpose together with a system of measures for its
accomplishment." 6 The purpose is the end; the measures the
means.
The highest level of strategy is grand or national
strategy. The Department of Defense (DoD) Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms defines national strategy as:
The art and science of developing and using the
political, economic and psychological powers of a
nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and
war, to secure national objectives.
'
A component of national strategy is military
strategy:
The art and science of employing the armed forces of
nation to secure the objectives of national policy by
the application of force or the threat of force. 5
This definition is closely patterned after Clausewitz's
"theory of using battles for the purpose of war." 9 As part
of the armed forces, each of the services is assigned
specific roles in support of the comprehensive military
6J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1967)
,
p~. 13.
7Dictionarv of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub
1) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987) , p. 244
.
8 Ibid., p. 232.
9Clausewitz, p. 69.
strategy. However, the DoD definition provides little
guidance on how the services might prepare for these roles.
The following conception of military strategy is more useful
to this end:
The art of strategy is to determine the aim , which is or
should be political; to derive... a series of military
requirements they create, and the preconditions which
the achievement of each is likely to necessitate; to
measure available and potential resources against the
requirements and to chart from this process a coherent, npattern of priorities and a rational course of action . 1U
Referring back to the general definition of
strategy, the aim denotes the purpose; the course of action
is the system of measures. The aim of military strategy
should be determined at the highest level of the national
security apparatus. It should be derived from national or
grand strategy. The course (or courses) of action should be
of a joint nature, a synthesis of individual service
capabilities. They are determined by comparing and
contrasting requirements, preconditions and resources with
service capabilities in order to develop a "coherent pattern
of priorities.
"
By this definition, separate and distinct service
strategies do not exist. Each component service is assigned
specific roles within the framework of the national military
strategy. The services, in turn, analyze the requirements,
preconditions and resources necessary to achieve their
roles. Ideally, this results in ordered courses of action
derived from and designed to accomplish a specific service
function within the national military strategy.
2 . Planning
There is a great deal more material available about
corporate strategic planning than there is on its defense




counterpart. 11 In fact, significant portions of military
strategic planning have been adapted from the corporate
sector. 12 However, Allen Schick does provide a useful
definition in an article on the evolution of the Defense
Department's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS) . According to Schick, strategic planning is:
The process of deciding on objectives of the
organization, on changes in these objectives, on the
resources used to attain these objectives, and on
policies that are to govern the, acquisition, use and
disposition of these resources. 1 -*
This definition adds another element to the notion of
strategy as a purpose combined with a system of measures to
accomplish it. Specifically, strategic planning is future-
oriented. It is concerned with determining objectives,
conditions that might impact objectives, and policies to
attain them regardless.
Strategic planning takes place at all of the
aforementioned levels of strategy. This is depicted in
Figure 1, and described in general terms below. 14 The
discussion is of the interest-objective approach to defense
planning. As will be shown, other approaches are also used.
However, this method is generally the most comprehensive.
11See King and Cleland, Strategic Planning and Policy ;
Marcus, Building the Strategic Plan ; Moskow, Strategic
Planning in Business and Government ; Radford, Strategic
Planning: An Analytical Approach among" others.
12 See especially The Maritime Balance: The Navy
Strategic Planning Experiment , 1979
.
13Allen Schick, "The Road to PPBS: The Stages of Budget
Reform," Public Administration Review . December 1966, p. 244.
14This diagram is adapted from Strategic Concepts of
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Figure 1 Levels of Strategic Planning
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Figure 1 (continued) Levels of Strategic Planning
At the grand or national level, the planner is
concerned with determining national "interests and
objectives [to] establish strategic requirements, . . .policies
[to] provide rules for satisfying them. .
.
[and] assets [to]
provide the means." 15
At the national military level, strategic planning
is the process of assessing alternative futures, determining
political and/or military objectives and developing courses
of action to achieve them. A broad course of action (i.e.,
national military strategy) details the roles or functions
of the individual services. The services compare existing
capabilities with those required by the strategy to
determine future requirements. These are sent back to the
national military level where the requirements of each
service are prioritized in order to best meet the overall
needs of strategy.
The planning that occurs at the service level is the
subject of this study. National military strategy
establishes the strategic context within which the services
operate. It assigns them broad roles or missions. These
functions are the ends or objectives in their planning
processes. The services must develop a system of measures to
achieve them. Service strategic planning is derivative of
and subordinate to its national and national military
counterparts
.
The problem confronting service planners is similar
to that of the corporate sector. Broad objectives are known
(e.g. , ensure security of the sea lines of communication
(SLOC) or increase productivity) . What is required is a
course of action and a methodology for visualizing future
requirements
15John Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and





Charles M. Mottley describes the problem-solving
process as follows:
Relate your missions to estimates of future situations;
diagnose your needs; identify the issues...; conduct
strategic analyses and studies to help define
alternative courses or options; agree upon an
appropriate policy, then transform it into a preferred
course of action. ib
The most difficult part of the process occurs prior
to the policy formulation stage. The future strategic
situation must be envisioned. Missions must be thoroughly
understood in relation to that future. Strategic analysis
must identify suitable, feasible, and acceptable options. 17
The option must be suitable in terms of the mission or
missions it is designed to accomplish. It must be feasible
with respect to future operational requirements,
environments, and resources. Finally, it must be acceptable
in terms of performance, cost, timing and effectiveness. 18
Obviously, the factors used to measure the suitability,
feasibility and acceptability of an option are key to the
entire procedure.
3 . Naval Strategic Planning
In general, strategic planning is the process of
determining the purpose or objective of strategy and
developing the measures to achieve it. It is oriented ten to
2 5 years in the future.
Naval strategic planning is a specialized branch
concerned with developing options to accomplish the roles or
functions assigned to the Navy by national military
strategy. National military strategy determines the Navy's
16Charles M. Mottley, "Strategic Planning," in Lyden
and Miller, Planning, Programming and Budgeting: A Systems
Approach to Management (Chicago: Markham, 1972)
,
p. 130.
17 Ibid., p. 134.
18 Ibid., p. 138. See also Sound Military Decision
(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 194 3) for a moredetailed description of suitability, feasibility and
acceptability as measures.
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broad objectives or missions. The naval strategic planning
problem is to analyze the missions, ascertain what is
required to accomplish them, and select the means to that
end. Furthermore, the entire process must be future-
oriented.
Essentially, and for the purposes of this study,
naval strategic planning is force planning. The following
definition is proposed:
Peacetime naval strategic planning is the process of
determining future force requirements to accomplish the
roles and missions assigned by national military
strategy. Naval needs are ascertained through mission
analysis and an evaluation of the future strategic
environment. Options are envisioned through
capabilities analysis. This analysis measures the
suitability, feasibility and acceptability of the
concept in terms of the future naval environment.
The process is illustrated in Figure 2. Ideally,
the output of this system is sent to the national military
level. There it is considered along with options from the
other services. These are prioritized and acted upon
according to the demands of the national military strategy.
It should be emphasized that the concern here is
long range (10-25 year) planning. The objective is to
visualize promising force concepts for research and
development. Some of the more common approaches to force
planning do not offer this forward-looking vision. Before
























Long or Short Term Force
Programs
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Annual Budget
Figure 2 Naval Strategic Planning Process
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D. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO DEFENSE PLANNING
Any discussion on force planning must begin with a
caveat. Force planning is a broad field of study, one in
which seemingly everyone has an opinion. Former Under
Secretary of the Navy R. James Woolsey noted this, writing:
The number of offices, institutions and influential
individuals in the government with different but firmly
held views about the proper future of the Navy is
beginning to approach the number of ships in the
fleet. iy
Necessarily, what follows is only an overview of the
subject.
One of the better articles on force planning recently
appeared in the Naval War College Review . Henry C.
Bartlett noted that:
PPBS . . .does not provide complete insight into
alternative approaches or focuses which force planners
use in the longer term to help them determine the level
and mix of required forces .... [D] ifferent planning
focuses tend to lead to alternative solutions or
choices. zu
A failure to recognize this point could confuse the
ends-means relationship in strategy. Forces or weapons
should not determine future strategy. However, their
capabilities and availabilities can influence future
strategic decisions. 21 The force planner should have an
appreciation of the assumptions upon which various
approaches are based.
19R. James Woolsey, "Planning a Navy: The Risks of
Conventional Wisdom," International Security , Summer 1978,
p. 18.
20Henry C. Bartlett, "Approaches to Force Planning,"
Naval War College Review , May-June 1985, p. 37.
21Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,, 1965)
, pp.261-2. For example, British procurement policies in the
1970' s greatly impacted its strategy in the 1982 Falklands
conflict, especially in anti-air warfare. See Department of
the Navy, South Atlantic Conflict Lessons Learned , 1983.
14
Bartlett's eight approaches to force planning are
depicted in Figure 3. 22 These categories are used mainly
to indicate tendencies. They are not absolutes. Actual
planning incorporates elements of each. The four
approaches considered below are more dominant than others in
U.S. force planning circles: Top Down; Fiscal;
Technological; and Threat-Scenario.
APPROACH PRIMARY FOCUS OTHER EMPHASIS







Threat Opponent Capability Net Assessment
Scenario Circumstances Opponent and
Vulnerability
Mission Mission Areas Mission Balance
Hedging Uncertainty Flexibility
Bottom Up Current Capabilities Shorter Term
Figure 3 Approaches to Force Planning
1. Top Down
The Top Down, or interest-objective, approach to
planning has been alluded to in a previous section.
Briefly, the process involves identifying a set of fixed
interests, juxtaposing them on alternative future
environments and creating a strategy to attain them. 23
Interests determine objectives and strategy. Strategy, in
turn, determines requirements. The process occurs
throughout the hierarchy of the national security apparatus
from the national level down to the individual services.
22 Bartlett, p. 37.
23U.S. Army, An Approach to





The main advantage of this approach is that it lends
a macro-perspective to the planning process. Each level
must focus on the ends or objectives determined by the next
higher echelon.
Disadvantages include the tendency for planners to
concentrate too heavily on the future. Important current
problems may be put off for future solution. Another
tendency is to ignore constraints for too long. Finally,
lower level planners may be hesitant in challenging
assumptions made at a higher echelon. This could result in
flawed policy decisions throughout the chain of command. 24
Overall, however, the Top Down method is the most
comprehensive planning approach. It is well suited to long
range planning. While many factors can change in a ten to
25 year period, national interests and objectives usually do
not.
2 . Fiscal
Budgetary constraints drive the Fiscal approach to
force planning. Obviously, all planning is subject to
monetary restrictions. However, they are the primary
emphasis in this approach. The Defense Department is
allocated a specific share of the Federal Budget after
domestic and foreign policy accounts are settled. 25
Strategies and force structures are developed from
available funds. The desired strategy is that which "is
most efficient also being the most economical." 26
One advantage of this approach is that defense
requirements are considered in context with other national
24 Bartlett, p. 38-39.
25William D. Staudenmaier, "Strategic Concepts for the
1980's," Military Review , March 1982, p. 37.
26Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics




objectives. Another is that fiscally constrained planning
may promote efficiency and effectiveness. 27
A major disadvantage is that resultant force
structures may be inadequate in relation to the threat.
Moreover, this approach encourages spending cycles dependent
on threat perception. Typically, a four to five year growth
cycle rapidly builds up existing forces. This is followed
by a down cycle in which recent improvements may be
forfeited. Long term continuity is lost. Finally, the
Fiscal approach promotes service rivalries. More emphasis
is placed on justifying budgetary shares than on coherent
national military strategy. 28
3 . Technological
This approach is based on technological optimism.
Technology is harnessed to remedy force imbalances. The
process is well rooted in American history; U.S. planners
have consistently consulted technology in developing force
multipliers. Generally, there are two different ways to
address the technology issue: reactive planning and
adaptive planning.
Technology is the driving force in the reactive
approach. A revolutionary technological breakthrough is on
the horizon. Weapons systems and platforms must be flexible
enough to accommodate rapid and unpredictable change:
It is the rapidity of change, the rapidity with which we
transition from one approach to another inside the
[adversary's] cycle of observation, decision and action
which is the key to victory.
^
y
The general problem with this approach is expense.
Rapid development of new systems or concepts every few years
does not come cheaply. Moreover, it tends to encourage
27 Bartlett, p. 47.
28 Ibid.
29Gary Hart, "The U.S. Senate and the Future of the
Navy," International Security , Spring 1978, p. 182.
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change for its own sake, divorced from any strategic
rationale. Nonetheless, the reactive method is well suited
to naval platforms. Ships are better able to accommodate
modernization than most other forces.
The adaptive approach rejects the technological
imperative. Improvements in capability are viewed as
evolutionary, not revolutionary. The spectacular
breakthrough is popular mythology. Rather, planners should
concentrate on a synthesis of different technologies to
provide desired mission capabilities:
The key is to identify the essential capabilities
for the general mission. .. and then to identify-.th
technologies essential for those capabilities. JO
Both approaches encourage initiative and innovation.
Moreover, they exploit a comparative U.S. strength. Former
Secretary of Defense Weinberger's policy of Competitive
Strategies is a recent positive example of this approach. 31
Disadvantages include the tendency to equate
complexity with quality at the expense of quantity. Quality
is a measure of mission effectiveness, not technological
complexity. Complex systems are expensive, slow to develop
and slow to produce in quantity. This means that fewer
numbers are affordable. Another disadvantage is the
tendency to spend too much for the last five percent of
capability. 32 Prudent planning balances the relationship
between quality, quantity and complexity with mission
requirements
.
30Karl Lautenschlager, "Technology and the Evolution of
Naval Warfare," International Security , Fall 1983, p. 48.
31See DoD Annual Report To The Congress Fiscal Year
1988 . "The central idea. . . is simple enough: aligning
•ing American s1
esses," p. 66.
32 Bartlett, p. 46.




One of the more common approaches to defense
planning is Threat-Scenario based. The two are combined
because for the past 30 years a single threat—the Soviet
Union—and a single scenario—the NATO-Warsaw Pact
conflict—have dominated the field. The process begins with
an assessment of opposing capabilities in a well defined
scenario. From this analysis, specific force deficiencies
are identified. Programs are developed to remedy these
shortfalls. Quantitative policy analysis aids in selecting
the most promising systems. The resulting mix of programs
is balanced against budgetary constraints. Finally, the
revised total force is reevaluated in terms of the original
scenario. Gaps in capability and other risks are identified
for future consideration.
There are a number of advantages to the Threat-
Scenario approach. It forces policy-makers to focus on total
military capability. 33 A properly constructed scenario may
reveal alternative tactics or strategies for exploitation.
It is generally believed that a force capable of responding
to a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict would be able to handle
lesser contingencies. 34 Threat-Scenario encourages the
establishment of priorities among competing systems or
services. Finally, the process readily adapts to
quantitative methods of policy analysis. 35
There are an equal, if not greater, number of
disadvantages to this approach. Most of these adversely
impact the Navy. Navies are versatile, multi-mission forces
with very long life cycles. The Threat-Scenario approach
focuses on a limited number of missions at a fixed point in
33 Bartlett, p. 42.
34 For another view see Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army
in Vietnam . The author argues that the Army's European-
oriented force structure and concept of warfare was not
applicable to conditions in Vietnam.
35Woolsey, p. 21.
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time against a specific threat. A navy tailored to a 1988
threat may be irrelevant in the year 2 000. Given the
longevity of ships, submarines and aircraft, the current
threat could change faster than our ability to adapt. 36
The planning initiative is passed to the adversary.
Examining a threat with an eye to counter it leads to a
defensive posture. One is always looking to defend, always
reacting. 37
The Threat-Scenario approach is based on a series of
assumptions to which the real world rarely conforms.
Moreover, there is a danger that the scenario may begin to
take on a life of its own. What were once assumptions
gradually become accepted as fact. 38 Alternately,
assumptions can be modified to argue virtually any position.
One analyst used this method to suggest eliminating the U.S.
surface navy:
An increasing number of defense authorities have
recognized a war in Europe, which is likely to begin
with little or no warning, would be decided in a matter
of weeks. .. .This suggests that convoy escorts, the ASW
mission for which many of our surface ships are best
suited, may not even exist in a NATO conflict-3 9 .
Lind does not address what happens if: (a) the war
is not in Europe; (b) it begins with plenty of warning; (c)
it is not decided quickly; (d) there is a national
requirement for surface units to do something other than
escort convoys, a task relevant only in a certain kind of
conflict. A glaring weakness of assumption-based planning
is obvious from this example. The scenario can only
36John B. Bonds, "A Thoroughly Efficient Navy: Review,"
Naval War College Review . Autumn 1987, p. 103.
37J.H.F. Eberle, "Designing a Modern Navy: Workshop
Discussion," in Power at Sea: II. Superpowers and Navies




38 Bartlett, p. 42.
39William S. Lind, "Is It Time to Sink the Surface
Navy?," USNI Proceedings , March 1978, p. 63.
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artificially test the ability of forces to cope in certain
situations. It can never prove that these situations will
come to pass. 40
A final disadvantage is that the approach lends
itself too readily to quantitative methods of policy
analysis. What cannot be quantified is often neglected.
Concepts, tactics and weapons "which do not respond to some
previously identified threat" have no constituency
.
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Important peacetime, crisis or out-of-theater missions are
not fully considered. These missions are the bread and
butter of navies. Moreover, their successful execution may
be what is required to avoid a war in the first place.
Finally, scenario forces are evaluated in terms of
quantitative cost-effectiveness. The question most often
asked is: "How much should be spent to give a ship some
marginal increment of additional performance. . .useful in
only a handful of imaginable scenarios?" 42 This kind of
reasoning often results in marginal force improvements
designed to counter known adversary capabilities.
Ultimately, improvements on the margin lead to parity.
In summary, the Threat-Scenario approach can be a
useful planning tool if properly employed. It can help
establish priorities. It can test the ability of forces in a
most demanding situation. However, the process is based on
a number of artificial assumptions. These may or may not
conform to the real world. The scenario only evaluates war-
fighting capability. Its planning perspective is narrow and
somewhat myopic. Taken to the extreme, this approach can
40Thomas H. Etzold, "U.S. Navy Planning in the 1970' s "
in Harry E. Borowski, ed. Military Planning in the Twentieth
Century (Washington: USAF Office of History, 1986)
,
p. 290.
41Richard J. Lunsford, "Defense Planning: A Time for
Breadth," Parameters . March 1978, p. 17.
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lead to a fundamental misunderstanding on the nature of war.
1600 years ago the Roman Vegetius wrote:
It is the nature of war, that what is beneficial to you
is detrimental to your enemy; and what is of service to
him always hurts you. It is therefore a maxim never to
do, or to omit doing, anything in consequence of his
conduct, but to consult invariably your own interests
only. 4J
The Threat-Scenario approach to planning turns this logic on
its head. It often premises planning on the enemy's
strengths, not its weaknesses. In the final analysis this
tends toward a stalemate.
E. ASSUMPTIONS OF THIS STUDY
The purpose of this introductory section was to
establish a conceptual framework for the remainder of the
study. The central question under consideration is: How
should the navy plan for its long range future? The
discussion touched on a numbers of topics— from strategy to
strategic planning to force planning. The theory presented
herein should be viewed in this context. It suggests an
alternative method for thinking about future naval force
concepts.
The theory can be summarized as follows. Desired
capabilities are determined by juxtaposing the naval roles
assigned by national military strategy with: (a) a
forecast of the future strategic environment; and (b) a
thorough understanding of basic naval missions. Next, the
suitability, feasibility and acceptability of these
capabilities are analyzed in terms of the broad trends in
naval warfare. The result is a series of force concepts
for the future. Based on priorities set at the national
level, resources are allocated to turn the concept into
systems or platforms.
43 Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Military Instructions . Book
III, p. 159.
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It is necessary at this point to make a distinction
between requirements and capabilities. The output of the
long range planning process is a set of concepts to guide
procurement policies. These are future force requirements.
They are based on des ired capabilities. Current
capabilities, on the other hand, drive present strategy:
[Sjtrategy must rest on the rock of core
capability. .. .the correlation of forces reveals what
strategy our forces can support, and a supportable .
.
military strategy governs national aims and ambitions. 44
This distinction is important because it underscores the
true objective of strategic planning—to provide future
forces with the capability necessary to support projected
strategic requirements. A failure to plan adequately for the
future could undermine national policy.
As with the other approaches to planning, this theory is
based on several assumptions. These are considered below.
* NAVAL STRATEGIC PLANNING IS NOT THE SAME AS
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGIC PLANNING. Naval planning
is subordinate to and derivative of its national
military counterpart. This study adopts the Top Down
method of determining objectives and strategy (depicted
in Figure 1) . Naval planning is based on the roles and
functions assigned by national strategy. Essentially,
for the purposes of this study, naval strategic planning
is future force planning.
* IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT WITH CERTAINTY THE
PATTERN OF A FUTURE WAR. 45 This is especially the case
for the 10-25 year period that is the subject of this
study. Preoccupation with specific threats or scenarios
tends to narrow the planner's vision. The objective of
long range planning is to develop concepts that cover a
44Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., "Naval Tactics and Their
Influence on Strategy," Naval war College Review , p. 3.
45Adapted from Wylie, Military Strategy , p. 83.
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broad spectrum of possibilities. 46 These concepts
should be derived from the capabilities one desires in
the future. This perspective is attained by focusing on
missions and warfare trends within the context of
overall strategy.
* THE ENDS SHOULD DICTATE THE MEANS. It is essential
that naval roles and functions be analyzed in terms of
the four naval missions: deterrence, sea control, power
projection, and influence. A mission-orientation helps
establish naval ends. For example, the primary
objective of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is to aid in
securing working control of the sea. A means to that
end is the sinking of submarines. Therefore, the proper
planning guestion is: What does the ASW concept under
consideration contribute to securing a working control
of the sea? Its submarine-sinking ability is one
measure, albeit a very important one, of total
capability. This is what is meant by a mission-oriented
perspective.
* TECHNOLOGY IS BEST EMPLOYED BY FIRST DETERMINING THE
CAPABILITY DESIRED. This is the adaptive approach to
technology employment. Naval missions and warfare trends
help to establish desired capabilities. New or existing
technologies are then harnessed to attain them. This
approach does not rule out the possibility of a
technological breakthrough; nor does it imply that the
planner will always be capable of recognizing the
potential of new technologies. 47 However, the vast
majority of technological innovations are
evolutionary. 48 The adaptive approach seeks a balance
46 Ibid., p. 84.
47See Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. Fleet Tactics: Theory and
Practice (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987) , Chapter
13 for an in-depth discussion on the influence of
technology on tactics.
48 Lautenschlager, p. 4.
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between technological opportunities and tactical
requirements based on projected mission and warfare
trends.
* THE OUTPUT OF THE LONG RANGE PLANNING PROCESS IS A
CONCEPT, NOT A SPECIFIC PLATFORM. The first task of
planning is to guide the organization into an uncertain
future. It must identify those factors which can be used
to determine future requirements. The resultant
concepts can then be further developed as required by
the organization's overall needs. Strategic planning is
first and foremost a frame of mind for conceptualizing
these requirements. This study proposes nothing more
than a theory to establish that framework.
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II. THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT: MARITIME POWER IN US STRATEGY
A. INTRODUCTION
The beginning of wisdom in American strategic thinking
i thai
powe]
is to recognize t the United States is first and
foremost a sea r. 4y
Maritime power is a fundamental component of total U.S.
national power. The United States has deep-seated
political, economic and security interests in the use of
the sea. It has benefited enormously from said use. The
naval strategic planning process should rightly begin with
an appraisal of the future role of the sea in national
military strategy. This section examines three topics to
that end: (1) the nature of maritime power; (2) naval roles
in national military strategy; and (3) an assessment of how
these roles might evolve in the future. The objective is
to articulate not only why the U.S. reguires a navy, but
also its future functions in national military strategy.
This establishes a strategic context on which to base the
naval planning process.
B. MARITIME POWER
The naval planner should have an appreciation for the
nature of maritime power. This includes the following two
factors: a working definition and its strategic importance.
Many faulty assumptions about the Navy's role in national
military strategy are founded on a basic misunderstanding of
maritime power. Henry E. Eccles writes:
A failure to understand the simple fundamentals [of
maritime power] tends to create uncertainty and
49Ray S. Cline, "Needed: An 'All-Oceans Alliance,'" Sea
Power , April 1980, p. 39.
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misunderstanding in subsequent development n
structures, operations, policy and plans. DU
Definition 1/JxJ*
of force
Maritime power is an element of national power which
contains two sub-systems: sea power and sea force. 51 Sea
power is merchant (and other) shipping, maritime bases and
their supporting infrastructures. Sea force is the navy (the
definition would include the Coast Guard and the Marine
Corps). 52 This relationship is depicted in Figure 4. 53
National
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Figure 4 Maritime Power
The diagram is useful because it defines maritime
power in its entirety. Importantly, naval forces are
depicted as more than simply the sea-based leg of the armed
services. They are the enforcement arm of the maritime
component of national power. Their value is directly related
to the importance of that component in the overall
structure. This point should not be underemphasized. The
naval function transcends traditional methods of evaluating
50Henry E. Eccles. "Strategic Principles and the




p. 51. See also James Eberle, "Maritime
Strategy," Naval Forces . No. II 1987, p. 41.
53Adapted from William Reitzel, "Mahan on the Use of





military power (e.g., deterrence or war-fighting capacity).
It must be performed across the spectrum of conflict. It
directly supports the national power system in peace, crisis
and war. Naval power is "wholly about the use of the sea and
only incidentally about the use of force at sea." 54
2 . Strategic Importance
The strategic importance of maritime power is
derived from a characteristic of the sea. The oceans cover
two-thirds of the Earth's surface. Importantly, they are
controlled by no nation. A country with the ability to use
. . . .
the sea can benefit politically, economically and militarily
relative to other nations. It can extend its sovereignty to
non-adjacent areas of interest. This is a strategic
quality. 55 A navy's function is to ensure that advantage.
In general, there are three important uses of the
sea: (1) as an efficient means of transport; (2) as a
valuable source of natural resources; and (3) as a base for
threatening or exercising military power against the
shore. 56 From these uses come the general functions of
naval forces: (1) to prevent or secure the conveyance of
people or goods; (2) to prevent or secure the acquisition of
sea-based resources; and (3) to prevent or secure the
projection of military force versus targets ashore. 57
In summary, maritime power is more than the ability
to wage war at sea. It is an integral component of the
national power system. Naval forces are the maritime
enforcement arm. The relative importance of the sea in the
54Michael MccGwire, "Changing Naval Operations and
Military Intervention," Naval War College Review , Spring
1977, p. 6.
55Ibid., p. 5.
56See James A. Barber, "The Uses of Naval Force," p.
76; or Ken Booth, "Roles, Objectives and Tasks: An Inventory
of the Functions of Navies," p. 84; both in Naval War
College Review , Summer 1977.
57MccGwire, p. 5.
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overall system should determine the value and strength of
the naval arm.
Maritime power permits a country to extend its
sovereignty to non-adjacent areas. The three general uses of
the sea are for transport, resources and projection of power
ashore. Naval forces can prevent or secure these uses in
support of national policy.
C. NAVAL ROLES IN NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
Ideally, national interests and objectives determine the
relative importance of maritime power in the overall
security system. National military strategy, in turn,
assigns the Navy broad roles to secure interests and
objectives. The roles are based on the general uses of the
sea noted above. The following discussion derives current
naval roles using this, the Top Down, approach.
1. National Interests and Objectives
National interests are generalized statements
describing factors deemed important to continued U.S.
prosperity and security. They encompass both broad ideals
and specific security concerns. 58 Interests vary in
intensity from those that are vital to survival, to those
that are simply desirable outcomes. 59 Current U.S. national
interests are depicted in Figure 5. 60
National security objectives are "broad goals which
support and advance the national interests." 61 Their
purpose is to provide general guidelines to assist in the
58U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the




59See Donald E. Nuechterlein, National Interests and
Presidential Leadership: The Setting of Priorities (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1978)
, pp. 4-18.
60Adapted from National Security Strategy of the United





formulation of foreign and defense policies. Recent U.S
national security objectives are shown in Figure 6. 62
Survival of the U.S. with its fundamental
values and institutions intact.
A healthy and growing economy.
Growth of freedom, democracy and free market
economies throughout the world linked by fair
and open international trade system.
Stable and secure, world free from major
threats to U.S. interests.
Health and vigor of U.S. alliance
relationships.
Figure 5 U.S. National Interests
To maintain the security of our nation and
our allies.
To respond to the challenges of the global
economy.
To defend and advance the cause of democracy,
freedom, and human rights throughout the
world.
To resolve peacefully disputes which affect
U.S. interests in troubled regions of the
world.
To build effective and favorable relationships
with all nations with whom there is a basis of
shared concern.
Figure 6 U.S. National Security Objectives
62Adapted from National Security Strategy , p. 4-5.
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The importance of maritime power in securing these
interests and objectives is apparent. The United States has
global interests and responsibilities. It has basic
political, economic and military requirements to use the
sea. Politically, America is separated by two oceans from
its major allies and the "troubled regions of the world."
Economically, U.S. prosperity is tied to an interdependent
global system of trade. A full "99.8 percent of the more
than 700 million tons of goods transported annually in U.S.
overseas trade goes by ship." 63 Moreover, both the U.S. and
its allies are dependent on resources located overseas.
Militarily, nearly every conceivable threat to U.S.
interests necessitates using the seas for both transport and
projection purposes.
Maritime power is a critical component of the
overall national security system by any criteria. Much of
the above discussion is fairly obvious. However, it is
important to return to first causes in establishing a
strategic context for the long range planning process.
First and foremost, America requires a navy because it "must
be able to use the high seas whenever and wherever it finds
it necessary." 64 U.S. military strategy assigns the Navy
certain roles to secure that use.
2 . Present National Military Strategy
National military strategy is a component part of
grand strategy. It is concerned with the employment of
military power in support of policy. U.S. national military
strategy has remained relatively constant over the last 2 5
years. Generally, it has consisted of four basic elements:
63J. P. Moorer, "U.S. Naval Strategy of the Future,"
Strategic Review , spring 1976, p. 76.
64James L. Holloway, "The U.S. Navy - A Functional
Appraisal," Oceanus , Summer 1985, p. 3.
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Deterrence; Flexible Response; Forward Deployment; and Arms
Control. 65
Deterrence of aggression has been America's basic
defense strategy since 1945. 66 Deterrence protects U.S.
interests by convincing an adversary that the risks of
aggression are unacceptable. It requires both the
capability and the resolve to fight at varying levels of
violence.
Flexible Response is meant to provide a wide range
of military options commensurate with the level of
provocation. It supports deterrence by convincing the
adversary that any aggression can be countered by force.
One of the main objectives of Flexible Response is to
establish some degree of control over the scope, intensity
and duration of the conflict. 67
Geopolitical considerations dictate that U.S. forces
be forward deployed. Alliance solidarity is an integral
part of national security policy. The U.S. depends on its
allies not only for military security but also for economic
prosperity. The forward deployment of U.S. forces reassures
our allies and helps to stabilize the world environment. 68
The trend over the last eight years has been to
integrate arms control objectives with defense policy. The
arms control agenda should "enhance deterrence, reduce
risk... [and] support alliance relationships." 69 The
inclusion of arms control in national military strategy
ensures that arms control proposals do not inadvertently
undermine other aspects of defense policy.




66Annual Report , p. 42.
67 Stratecric Concepts of the U.S. Navy , p. 1-2-2.
68Annual Report , p. 49.
69National Security Strategy , p. 23.
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3 . Present Naval Roles
As used in this study, the difference between naval
roles and naval missions is one of emphasis. 70 Naval roles
are general statements describing what naval forces do in
support of military strategy. Naval missions are directly
concerned with how the roles are performed.
The Navy identifies three main roles it conducts in
support of national military strategy: (1) strategic nuclear
deterrence; (2) providing the maritime component of overseas
deployed forces; and (3) ensuring the security of the sea
lines of communications (SLOCs). 71 The relationship between
these roles and the deterrence, forward deployment and
Flexible Response elements of military strategy is apparent.
They are also related to the general uses of the sea
described previously. This relationship is depicted in
Figure 7
.
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Figure 7 Naval Roles vs Uses of the Sea
70Naval missions will be covered in depth in the
following section.
71William Crowe, "Western Strategy and Naval Missions
Approaching the 21st Century," in J.L. George ed. , Problems
of Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty First Century





It should be noted that in performing their roles,
naval forces can either secure or prevent the corresponding
use of the sea. For example, maritime forward deployed
forces could either project naval power ashore or prevent
another nation from doing so. Similarly, forces in a
nuclear deterrence role could either promote the viability
of our deterrent or threaten to undermine the adversary's. 72
D. THE FUTURE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AT SEA
The future strategic environment at sea depends on three
factors: (1) changes in the uses of the sea; (2) changes in
national military strategy; and (3) changes in naval roles
in military strategy. These issues are discussed below.
1. Uses of the Sea
How man has used the oceans has remained fairly
constant over time. However, the relative importance of
these various usages to man has grown. This trend should
continue. Shipping is now the most efficient and economical
means of extra-continental transportation. A revolutionary
breakthrough in other forms of locomotion is unlikely.
Therefore, sea-based transport will continue to be the
dominant mode, linking together an interdependent world
economy.
The future of sea-based power projection is less
certain. On one hand, navies equipped with long-range
nuclear weapons are capable of striking land targets with
relative impunity. However, the viability of low-to-mid
intensity power projection is more complicated. This is
because of the proliferation of land-to-sea missiles and
missile-carrying patrol boats and aircraft in the
inventories of even the smallest navies. The situation has
72 Provided, of course, that it is determined these
actions enhance deterrence.
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led some analysts to question the future role of naval power
projection. 73
The most dynamic changes affecting the use of the
sea concern the increased significance of the ocean as a
resource base. A growing number of nations are exploiting
the sea as a new source of food, energy and raw materials. 74
The trend has been for smaller countries to claim large
areas of the sea and seabed for their exclusive use. This
process threatens to undermine a characteristic of the sea
on which maritime powers depend; "their status as an




In summary, the seas will be increasingly important
and the site of growing competition in the future. Shipping
should remain the most economical means of transport.
Smaller nations may attempt to extend their sovereignty over
larger areas of the sea and seabed in their quest for
resources. At the same time, low-to-mid intensity naval
power projection could become more difficult as a result of
the anti-ship missile threat. This is a disturbing trend for
countries, like the U.S., that promote free use of the seas.
Its interest in securing freedom of the seas will
necessitate a viable naval power projection capability.
However, the future environment may make these operations
more risky.
73 See especially Michael MccGwire, "Changing Naval
Operations and Military Intervention," Naval War College
Review . Spring 1977, p. 8.
74Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age




75James A. Barber, "The Uses of Naval Force," Naval War
College Review . Summer 1977, p. 76.
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2 . National Military Strategy
In assessing the future of U.S. national military
strategy, Colonel William 0. Staudenmaier, USA, noted the
following strategic trends: 76
* Superpower Nuclear Parity
* Nuclear Proliferation
* Depletion of Non-Renewable Resources
* Economic Interdependence
* Increased Importance of Transnational Movements
* Growth of Regional Centers of Power
* Five Major Power Centers
(U.S., U.S.S.R., P.R.C., Western Europe, Japan)
The affect these trends will have on the four pillars of
U.S. defense policy is uncertain. However, some of the
possibilities are considered below.
Deterrence is likely to remain the cornerstone of
U.S. strategy. In particular, nuclear deterrence will
continue to influence how other operations are carried out.
This is especially the case if another nuclear power is
involved. An irrevocable feature of modern strategy is that
all lesser military operations are conducted in a nuclear
context.
The strategic debate in the 1990 's will probably
center around the future of Flexible Response, particularly
as it applies to Western Europe. Some analysts believe the
U.S. should "emphasize a wider range of contingencies
than... the massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe." 77
In a similar vein, others contend that Superpower nuclear
parity has stabilized the situation in Europe. They support
a strategy of "flexible global response using
76William 0. Staudenmaier, "Strategic Concepts for the
1980*s," Military Review . April 1982, pp. 40-44.
77 piscriminate Deterrence , Report of The Commission On
Integrated Long-Term Strategy, January 1988, p. 2.
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technologically advanced conventional forces." 78 The debate
is by no means concluded and is likely to be very
controversial. How it will impact the Navy remains to be
seen.
Closely related to the future of Flexible Response
is the policy of forward deployment. The Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy recently concluded that
forward deployed forces "in some critical, threatened areas"
will remain a fixture of U.S. defense policy. 79 However,
two trends point to a change in the nature of forward
deployment. The first is the growth of regional powers in
areas of vital U.S. interests (e.g., Southwest Asia, Pacific
Basin, and South/Central America) . Second is the
difficulty of securing and maintaining bases in these
regions. The Commission has identified a requirement for:
versatile, mobile forces, minimally dependent on
overseas bases, that can deliver precisely ncontrolled
strikes against distant military targets. eu
These developments could substantially increase the role of
maritime forward deployment in military strategy.
Finally, recent trends in arms control policy
indicate a new emphasis on conventional force reductions. 81
Thus far attention has been centered around the conventional
balance in Europe. However, naval forces are by no means
exempt from the debate. In a recent statement, Soviet
Secretary General Gorbachev proposed freezing or reducing
the size of naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea. 82 Thus,
78Richard B. Cheney and Thomas N. Harvey, "Strategic
Underpinnings of a Future Force," Military Review , October
1986, p. 5.
79Discriminate Deterrence , p. 3.
80 Ibid.
81National Security Strategy , p. 25.
82
"World News," The Wall Street Journal . 17 March 1988,
p. 1, Col. 3. He further recommended that the action begin
July 1st of this year. This is the latest round of a long-
standing Soviet policy to limit U.S. naval deployments.
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arms control issues could influence future naval policy
decisions.
3 . Naval Roles
Changes in military strategy and the uses of the sea
will also affect naval roles. It should be noted that this
discussion concerns changes of a strategic nature.
Operational and tactical matters are addressed in other
sections of this study.
Strategic nuclear deterrence is more a national role
than a naval one. It does not directly contribute to the
nation's ability to use the sea. In many respects, however,
nuclear deterrence is the Navy's most important task. This
is because the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is the
most survivable (and therefore most credible) leg of the
nuclear triad. Any future development that degraded SSBN
survivability (e.g. , ASW advances) could undermine its
credibility as a deterrent. Such a situation would probably
necessitate employing a larger number of general purpose
forces in a SSBN protection role. This scenario applies
equally to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In either case, the
strategic importance of acoustical research and development
is apparent. Moreover, general purpose naval forces may be
used more frequently in pro/anti-SSBN roles in the future.
Another changing aspect of nuclear deterrence could
affect future naval roles—strategic defense. The mobility
and flexibility of naval units make them possible candidates
for strategic defense systems. There is, however, a major
problem with this concept. The SSBN is so vital to
deterrence that it is not used in other roles. A similar
situation could develop if strategic defense systems were
placed on surface units. The net effect might be a loss of
overall naval capability. Thus, future deterrence concepts
should be considered in context with their impact on other
naval roles.
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Finally, there is an aspect of deterrence that has
not changed since nuclear weapons were first introduced.
Specifically, the presence of nuclear weapons at sea
"associates naval tactics with strategic considerations
which override them and give them a context which must never
be overlooked." 83 In other words, it is no longer possible
to discuss other naval roles in a non-nuclear context.
The future of maritime forward deployment has been
alluded to in the assessment of national military strategy.
The trend appears to be toward an increased global naval
presence to counter three factors: (1) open-ocean Soviet
naval deployments; (2) erosion of the maritime right of free
passage; and (3) shifting strategic emphasis from Europe to
other areas of the world. The most likely kind of conflict
forward deployed forces would encounter is the low intensity
variety. President Reagan has stated that low intensity
conflict can lead to:
* Interruption of Vital Resources
* Loss of Basing or Access Rights
* Expanded Threats to the SLOCs
* Expanded Opportunity for Soviet Gains
* Undermining Allies and Trading Partners 84
Consequently, there is likely to be a continued strategic
requirement for naval power projection. Given the lethality
of modern anti-ship missiles, survivability may be as
important as striking power in a future power projection
force concept.
The final naval role is security of the sea lines of
communications. This traditional task will be as important
as ever in the future. The post-war years have been
characterized by two trends relative to the SLOCs: increased
83Hubert Moineville, Naval Warfare Today and Tomorrow
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd. , 1983), p. 45.
84National Security Strategy , pp. 32-34.
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U.S. and allied dependence and a tendency to take free
passage on the oceans for granted. 85 In peace, the SLOCs
are vital to economic prosperity. In conflict, the
requirement to move men and equipment across the ocean make
them an integral part of the war effort. The major threats
to the security of the SLOCs are the submarine in the open
ocean, the patrol craft or mines in the choke-points, and
land-based aircraft in both locations. Future SLOC security
will require forces capable of controlling large segments of
the ocean, above, below and on its surface.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this section was to establish a strategic
context for the naval planning process. Future force
planning requires an appreciation for the role of maritime
power in U.S. strategy. The analysis began by returning to
first causes—the nature of maritime power and the six uses
of the sea. The relative importance of the sea in overall
strategy is determined by national interests and objectives.
National military strategy then assigns broad naval roles
based on the aforementioned uses of the sea. The process is
useful for long-range planning because interests, objectives
and strategy are relatively constant factors.
An assessment of the future can be made once the general
framework is established. The objective is to identify
trends and constants to guide force planning. Together,
these factors define the future strategic environment. A
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* Erosion of the right of free passage
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
* Shift in strategic emphasis from Europe
to Pacific Basin, South/Central America,
Southwest Asia
* Abiding nuclear context for all naval
operations
* Strategic Defense/Conventional Arms Control
NAVAL ROLES
* Continuing importance of sea lines of
communications
* Increased maritime forward deployment
as strategy shifts and foreign base
access erodes
* Increased requirement for naval power
projection, especially in support of
sea control operations, with a
corresponding increase in the risk of
such operations
* Possible increase in pro/anti-SSBN role
for general purpose forces
Figure 8 The Future Strategic Environment
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III. THE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT: NAVAL MISSIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
In the conduct of naval war all operations will be found
to relate to two broad classes or object. The one is to
obtain or dispute the command of the sea, and the other
to exercise such control of communications as we have R ,
whether the complete command has been secured or not. 5b
The purpose of this section is to develop an
operational context for the naval long-range planning
process. The operational context links the strategical
requirements discussed above with the tactical trends
examined in a later section. Analysis of the future
strategic environment answers the question: What roles will
future forces be required to perform? A survey of tactical
trends will help answer the question: Which means should be
developed? The connecting element is the operational
context. It describes how the forces will accomplish their
roles
.
Naval force planning should be guided by both top-down
and bottom-up influences. The overall goal should be to
develop forces that not only fulfill strategic requirements,
but also are attuned to the changing nature of naval
warfare. A thorough understanding of the naval operational
milieu is crucial to this process. Over the years, the
content of naval operations has evolved in consonance with
changes in strategic demands from above and tactical
developments from below. The form of these operations,
however, has remained relatively constant. 87 That form is
the subject of this section—the operational context.
86Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime





87Content refers to the forces employed to accomplish
various operational tasks and their impact on the task
itself. Form is the underlying theory behind the operation
(i.e., how the task was derived and why it is important).
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Understanding this context is an important step toward
effectively integrating changes from above and below.
The section is divided into four parts: (1) an
explanation of why missions are used to describe the
operational context; (2) a brief overview of peacetime and
crisis missions; (3) a more detailed analysis of wartime
missions; and (4) an assessment of how this information can
be useful to the force planner.
B. A MISSION ORIENTATION
Naval missions were chosen to define the operational
context for several reasons. First, a mission orientation
focuses attention on operational outputs or objectives. 88
The purpose of a navy is to ensure or to exploit the use of
the sea. Naval missions are directly concerned with
securing, disputing or exercising said usage in peace and
war. Second, naval missions are historically derived.
Today's analyst can benefit from the works of past naval
theorists by adopting this approach.
Finally, naval missions are based, in part, on the
nature of the media in which the forces operate. There are
several fundamental differences between land and naval
warfare. 89 As will be shown, some of the confusion about
the Navy's role in defense strategy results from a failure
to recognize this point. For example, consider the following
statement:
The Air Force and Navy, by virtue of their focus on
operational media more than warfare, have developed
independent theories and strategies for the purposes and
88See Stansfield Turner, "Missions of the U.S. Navy,"
Naval War College Review , March-April 1974, pp. 2-3; or Ken
Booth Navies and Foreign Policy , p. 24 for an in-depth
analysis of the benefits of a mission orientation.
89James J. Tritten and Roger Barnett, "Are Naval
Operations Unique?," Naval Forces . No. V 1986, pp. 20-33.
The authors contend naval operations are unique for the
following reasons: three dimensional nature; global
character; presence of non-belligerents; interaction with
adversary; different objectives and weapons; and close
proximity in crises.
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uses of their forces. Those independent service
strategies, much more than the defense strategy, inform
their visions on the nkinds of forces they want and howthey will use them. yu
This study argues that what Builder mistakes for
"independent theories and strategies" are nothing more than
missions based upon the nature of naval (or air) operations.
It is not possible to effectively integrate naval (or air)
forces into defense strategy without first taking these
missions into account. It is not "independent strategies"
that steer the Navy and only "independent theories" in the
sense that naval engagements are not fought like ground
battles. The unique characteristics of the sea cannot help
but inform the Navy's vision "on the kinds of forces [it]
wants and how [it] will use them." The conditions and
restrictions imposed by the sea help to define the
operational context of naval forces. This context is best
described by naval missions.
The Navy's basic mission is contained in Title 10 of the
U.S. Code. It states, in part, that:
The Navy shall be organized, trained and equipped
primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to
operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation
of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution
of war except as otherwise assigned and is generally
responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine
warfare and protection of shipping.
This mission statement is fairly broad and generalized, as
it should be. The Department of Defense has developed a
more specific interpretation, especially with respect to
force functions. Forces should be able to:
seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress
enemy sea commerce; to gain and maintain general naval
supremacy; to control vital sea areas and to protect
vital sea lines of communications; to establish and
maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of
naval operations; to seize and defend advanced naval
90Carl H. Builder, The Army in the Strategic Planning





bases; and to conduct such land and air operations as
may be essential to the prosecution of a naval
campaign. 91
Since the late 1950 's, the Navy has condensed these
multiple functions into two basic missions: sea control and
power projection. 92 However, this breakdown is incomplete.
It does not address the peacetime or crisis environment.
For the purposes of this study, naval missions are divided
into two categories: peace-keeping missions and combatant






Figure 9 Naval Missions
The majority of the analysis will concentrate on
combatant missions. While the peace-keeping function is of
egual (or greater) importance, its credibility is derived in
part from combatant capability. Thus, the operational link
between strategic requirements and tactical trends is the
interrelationship between sea control and power projection,
tempered by peace-keeping.
C. PEACE-KEEPING MISSIONS
The purpose of naval peace-keeping missions is
threefold: (1) to deter or dissuade another actor from
taking actions detrimental to U.S. interests; (2) to
reassure friends or allies of U.S. support; and/or (3) to
influence the outcome of a course of events using naval
forces. It should be noted that the breakdown of missions
91Department of Defense, "Functions of the Department
of Defense and Its Major Components," POD Directive 5100.1
.
1969, p. 9.
92Strateqic Concepts of the U.S. Navy , 1-3-1.
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in this category (i.e., nuclear deterrence and influence)
does not directly correspond to these three purposes. In
fact, the vast majority of the peace-keeping function could
be listed under the influence heading. Nuclear deterrence is
listed separately because that function requires certain
unique force characteristics. These are only briefly noted
in order to address the larger issue of influence.
1 . Nuclear Deterrence
As used here, nuclear deterrence refers directly to
the sea-based component of the nuclear triad—the ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) . It could be argued that other
assets be listed under this heading (e.g. , cruise missile
carriers) . However, from a force planning perspective, the
SSBN is the only unit dedicated solely to nuclear
deterrence. Other considerations influence the development
of dual-capable forces.
Generally, a viable sea-based nuclear deterrent has
the following characteristics: survivability, flexibility,
and credibility. Survivability is the capacity to respond
even after a first strike by an adversary. Flexibility is
the capability to respond at varying levels of force and
from varying directions. Finally, a credible deterrent is
one adequate in terms of quantity and quality, combined with
the perceived will to use it if attacked.
From an operational point of view, there is little
else to be said of nuclear deterrence. Most of the factors
that affect this category were discussed in the section on
strategic requirements. However, one point is worth
reiterating. Should the SSBN become more vulnerable in the
future, general purpose forces may be diverted to ensure its
survivability. This would be a combatant mission under the
heading of sea control in support of a power projection
capability.
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2 . Naval Influence
The naval influence mission involves the "use of
naval forces, short of war, to achieve political
objectives." 93 As noted above, influence can be employed to
dissuade, deter, or simply reassure another actor. A navy
is inherently more flexible than other forces by virtue of
its ability to move freely on the seas. This enables naval
forces to:
demonstrate graphically the real fighting power of one's
state in the international arena .... Demonstrative
actions... in many cases have made it possible to achieve
political ends without resorting to armed struggled 4
The endurance, mobility, projection ability and
relative freedom of action of naval forces provides the
policy-maker with a wide range of possible options. Some of
the more common uses of influence are listed below.
* To support international military commitments;
* To confirm political commitments on a routine basis;
* To demonstrate the capability to move and act in
support of interests;
* To assert interest in areas far from one's shores;
* To manifest a credible war-fighting capability in
times of increased tensions;
* To provide humanitarian aid;
To coerce an opponent to comply with a preferred
course of action. yD
*
There is an another aspect of naval influence worthy
of consideration. It not as apparent as other facets of
this category. However, it becomes particularly relevant
when, as is common today, an adversary's naval forces are
operating in the vicinity of our own forces. Specifically,
there is a distinction between sea control and naval
93 Turner, p. 14. See also James Cable, Gunboat
Diplomacy (London: Macmillan, 1981) for specific case
studies on the uses of naval influence in this century.
94 S.G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 1979)
, pp. 247-8.
95James F. McNulty, "Naval Presence - The Misunderstood
Mission," Naval War College Review . September-October 1974,
p. 26. See also Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy
,
Chapters
2 and 3 for an in-depth look at naval presence and influence.
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influence. Control of the sea in the traditional sense is
not always possible in a non-war situation. 96 The presence
of naval forces alone does not ensure control of the sea
because one is not at liberty to eliminate an opponent's
forces.
When both parties are present, and as long as either one
avoids a military clash, the relative strengths of naval
forces do not play the same role as in war. . . .Any
fighting ship capable of reacting. .. is enough to prevent
an attack, what counts is the fact that presence has to
do with something other than fighting. y/
A recent example involving naval operations off the
coast of Lebanon illustrates this point. In that scenario,
the U.S. established overwhelming naval superiority vis-a-
vis the Soviet Union. 98 However, that massive presence
could not guarantee the same degree of control that the
force would have been able to assert in war. In fact,
conditions of non-war might have even placed U.S. forces at
a distinct disadvantage. Nothing would have (did) prevented
Soviets warships from relaying to Syrian gunners the
composition and location of ingressing U.S. reconnaissance
or projection aircraft. In short, mere presence does not
equate to control
.
This distinction is important because it shows that
there are limitations to what naval influence alone can
achieve without combat. The simple dispatch of a naval task
force may not be sufficient to achieve one's objectives.
There are many factors involved in the calculus of naval
influence other than war-fighting capability. Therefore, it
96Jurgen Rohwer. "Naval Warfare Since 1945," USNI
Proceedings , May 1978, p. 69. As will be shown, absolute
control of the seas is unlikely even in war.
97Edward Wegener, "Theory of Naval Strategy in the
Nuclear Age," USNI Proceedings , May 1972, p. 203.
98The U.S. Navy deployed 2 Carrier Battle Groups, a
Surface Action Group and a Marine Amphibious Brigade in
comparison to 3-4 Soviet combatants. It is worth noting that
the Soviet Union acquiesced to U.S. dominance as compared
with, for example, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
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would be unwise to consult the mission as a guide to force
planning. In the final analysis, a naval unit cannot be
"designed" for influence or deterrence:
A general deterrent effect on potential adversaries can
only be conferred by an evident ability to perform
conventional maritime tasks efficiently. Concentrating
on the combatant function, in otherQwords, will take
care of the deterrent variant too. yy
D. COMBATANT MISSIONS
The naval combatant missions are sea control and power
projection. As noted earlier, the content of these missions
has varied over the years with changes in strategic
reguirements and/or tactical developments. Their basic form,
however, has remained relatively constant. This is because
the theory from which the missions are derived is sound.
1. A Theory of Missions
Naval theory is based upon the nature of warfare and
the unigue characteristics of the sea. 100 With respect to
warfare, theory acknowledges that man is by nature a land
creature. The seat of purpose in war is always on land. 101
A navy contributes to the war effort only to the extent that
it influences events ashore.
However, naval warfare is fundamentally different
from war on land. In land warfare, control of territory
usually eguates to control of the national life of a people.
For this reason, the operational objective in land warfare
involves seizing and occupying territory. The same is not
true in naval warfare. It is not possible to occupy the sea
in the same sense that one occupies territory on land.
Whereas control by one power or another is the normal state
of affairs on land, the seas are characterized by an absence
"Till, p. 216.
100r
'The theory discussed herein is derived principally
from Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy .
101Corbett, p. 11; or Hughes, Fleet Tactics , p. 25.
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of control. 102 Thus, naval theory must account for two
factors: (1) that forces be able to influence events ashore;
and (2) that the seas are totally controlled by no nation.
The operational objective in naval warfare is
control of the sea for a purpose. Exactly what that purpose
is will vary according to one's strategic reguirements and
the adversary's susceptibility to influence from the sea.
The important point is that the selected purpose (s) affect
events ashore. It should be noted that control can be
employed not only to adversely impact an adversary, but also
to ensure the welfare of the people in the maritime state
itself. Obviously, the decision on purpose lies at the very
core of the force planning process. A navy unable to
influence events ashore is irrelevant to most war efforts.
This is the reason why a mission orientation is considered
so crucial. Naval missions describe how forces can influence
events ashore.
Corbett divided naval functions into two categories:
those aimed at obtaining or disputing the command of the sea
and those aimed at exercising such control as has been
secured. 103 By command of the sea, Corbett meant "the
control of maritime communications, whether for commercial
or military purposes." 104 Obtaining command of the sea
influences events ashore by denying to the enemy "the
movement of his national life at sea." 105 Its impact is
directly proportional to the enemy's dependence on the
seas. Disputing command of the sea denies to an adversary
control of communications for his purposes. It is based on
the assumption that one is not strong enough to secure
command for oneself. Finally, exercising command exploits
102 Corbett, p. 79.; Brodie, p. 91; Moineville, p. 31;
Tritten, p. 25.
103 Corbett, p. 145.
104 Ibid., p. 80.
105 Ibid., p. 79.
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the control that has been obtained in order to directly or
indirectly affect military operations on land. This
category includes staging or defending against invasions,
attacking or defending commerce and directly supporting
projection operations against the shore. 106
Obviously, much has changed in naval warfare since
Corbett's time (e.g., the ability of naval forces to project
power ashore with nuclear weapons) . However, his basic
theoretical framework remains valid. Sea control and power
projection are the modern-day equivalents of command of the
sea and the exercise of that command.
2 . Sea Control
Command of the sea is more of a theoretical absolute
than a plausible operational objective. Stansfield Turner
has written that the transition in terminology from command
of the sea to sea control was "a deliberate attempt to
acknowledge the limitations on ocean control brought about
by the development of the submarine and the aircraft." 107
In practice, however, command has always been relative in
terms of area and time. Corbett described command of the sea
as either general or local (area) and permanent or temporary
(time) . He also stressed that, in practice, not even
general/permanent command could be absolute. 108 Thus, the
term, "sea control," more accurately reflects that which is
possible in practice rather than a change wrought by
technology.
Sea control is the U.S. Navy's most important
mission because "it is a prerequisite for the successful
conduct of other types of naval operations." 109 This point






operational objective of naval forces is control of the sea
for a purpose. Sea control is a necessary but not sufficient
step to that end. It can only establish the conditions
required to accomplish the objective. This does not mean to
imply that control and purpose (i.e., sea control and power
projection) are mutually exclusive missions. One does not
require complete control to project power; but neither can
one project power without some degree of control. The ideal
naval unit has the capability to do both.
Sea control is remarkably similar to air
superiority. Perhaps this is one reason why analysts like
Builder claim the Navy and the Air Force have separate
"strategies." Both missions aim to establish control over a
vast medium for other ends. Moreover, both are somewhat
irrelevant to the conflict unless they are exploited so as
to affect events on land. Finally, both missions are most
effectively accomplished by either destroying the
adversary's forces or preventing them from accomplishing
their mission.
Sea control can be defined as follows: The
employment of naval (and other) forces to establish control
over an ocean area for the period of time required to
accomplish military objectives. Turner identifies four
distinct approaches for obtaining control of the sea. 110
All are concerned with the destruction or neutralization of
enemy forces.
* Sortie Control attempts to confine the adversary to
its home waters or ports. This can be accomplished
either by blockade or strikes on bases.
* Choke-point Control exploits geographical straits or
narrows to isolate and destroy opposing forces.
* Open Area Operations actively seek out the adversary
on the high seas.
110Adapted from Turner, pp. 8-9.
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* Local Engagement is close-in defense against attacking
forces, such as in convoy escorting.
Given the difficulty of locating opposing forces at
sea, the first and last approaches are probably the most
efficient. However, if one has a requirement to use the seas
extensively, sortie or choke-point control operations are
almost a necessity. Open area operations are time consuming
and tie down a large number of units. Local engagement
passes the initiative at sea to the adversary.
There are also varying degrees of sea control. These
are depicted in Figure 10. 111 Again, these categories are
relative with respect to area and time. The goal is to
obtain that degree of control necessary to accomplish
military objectives. Obviously, movement toward absolute
control (i.e., command of the sea) improves one's strategic
position vis-a-vis the enemy. Nonetheless, the overall naval
objective is not to gain or maintain control, but rather to
use the sea for other purposes or deny use to others. 112









* ENEMY ABSOLUTE. .
.
Figure 10 Degrees of Sea Control
111Adapted from Eccles, p. 54.
112Herbert Rosinski, The Development of Naval Thought




3 . Power Projection
Naval power projection is defined as follows: The
employment of sea control in order to directly or indirectly
support the land, sea or air campaign. This definition is
closely patterned after Corbett ' s exercise of command. The
objective is to exploit the degree of control that has been
obtained to influence events ashore.
The following tasks are associated with the mission:
* Nuclear Strike
* Movement/Protection of Military Reinforcements
and Logistical Support Equipments
* Commerce Interdiction
* Naval Gunfire/Missile or Tactical Air Support
* Amphibious Landing of Forces
The above definition is broader than the one that
has dominated U.S. naval thought since 194 5. The prevalent
U.S. conception of power projection arbitrarily draws a line
at the water's edge: those functions that are accomplished
afloat are labelled sea control; those that involve
breaching the shoreline fall under the heading of power
projection. 113 One probable reason for this division is
that, for a number of years after World War Two, the U.S.
Navy encountered no significant opposition at sea. Naval
doctrine naturally focused on those tasks likely to have the
greatest impact ashore. The notion of naval power
projection became closely linked to gunfire support,
tactical air projection and amphibious assault. In the long
run, however, this arbitrary division is dysfunctional. It
complicates the task of articulating naval requirements. Two
current trends could exacerbate the situation in the future.
First, the growth of the Soviet Navy, combined with
the proliferation of shore-based anti-ship weapons (aircraft
113 See especially Turner, p. 10-13. Naval bombardment,
tactical air projection and amphibious assault are the tasks
most commonly included in the power projection category.
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and missiles) , has compounded the problems associated with
sea control. The U.S. Navy can no longer depend on obtaining
an uncontested ability to operate at sea, especially close
to land. This trend has increased the risks involved with
traditional over-the-shore projection tasks. It also
directly challenges another projection operation—the
movement of military goods and troops by sea.
Second, there has developed a tendency to classify
specific platforms as either sea control or power projection
units. The classification is based on the perceived ability
of the unit to directly attack or support an attack against
the shore. The trend has contributed, for example, to the
arbitrary designation of the AEGIS-equipped cruiser as a
power projection ship. 114 The argument against AEGIS could
then be made along the following lines: AEGIS is an
expensive asset that supports over-the-shore projection
operations; those operations may be less feasible in the
future; therefore, there is no requirement to procure a
large number of AEGIS platforms.
The long-term implications of these trends are
ominous. On the one hand, the proliferation of a largely
airborne threat could directly challenge the U.S. ability to
establish working control of the sea. On the other hand, a
platform that is highly capable of countering that threat is
endangered simply because it is associated with one aspect
of the power projection mission. This example is a symptom
of a larger problem. The debate on AEGIS and the future of
the aircraft carrier has focused almost exclusively on over-
the-shore power projection. There has been little
recognition of the most important point with respect to
naval missions—that sea control and power projection are
directly interrelated.
114See CBO Report, Future Budget Requirements for the
600 Ship Navy , p . 7 , or John A. Williams, "The U.S. Navy
Missions and Force Structure: A Critical Appraisal," Armed
Forces and Society . Summer 1981, p. 501.
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4 . Mission Interrelationship
Admiral Crowe has written that "sea control and
power projection are closely related. . .both functions depend
in large measure on the same forces." 115 In this view, the
notion of a "power projection ship" makes little sense. The
interrelationship between the naval combatant missions is a
function of three factors: (1) the naval operational
objective; (2) the maritime environment; and (3) fiscal
necessity.
The naval operational objective is control of the
sea for a purpose. The purpose (i.e., one of the power
projection tasks) cannot be accomplished without
establishing some degree of control. Control for its own
sake is irrelevant. The two missions fit together naturally.
The maritime environment imparts an advantage to the
side that actively seeks out the adversary. Corbett wrote
that "since maritime communications are common [to all], we
as a rule cannot attack... the enemy without defending"
ourselves. 116 Forward sea control operations automatically
support power projection functions by actively engaging
opposing forces. This enhances the survivability of nuclear
forces, protects combat replacement forces and supplies
transported by sea, and provides a secure operating area for
other projection tasks. Conversely, to effectively operate
in a forward sea control role requires some capability to
project power. The range of modern weapons dictates that
naval platforms have the capability to strike targets both
at sea and ashore. Otherwise shore-based facilities could
strike forces at sea with impunity.
Finally, there is a limit to the amount of resources
that can be devoted to naval construction. Therefore, it is




common misperception is that platforms such as AEGIS or the
aircraft carrier are only suitable for over-the-shore power
projection. It is then argued that too many assets are
required to defend a rather small force of attack aircraft.
This analysis neglects two key points: (1) that the
forward deployed carrier battle group facilitates free use
of the sea elsewhere; and (2) that the battle-group's
"defensive" air assets protect the entire fleet while
attriting opposing forces. The attrition of opposing forces
to facilitate free use of the seas is the definition of sea
control. Sea control and power projection are directly
interrelated. In the final analysis, the ideal naval
platform is one whose capabilities are maximized for both
missions.
E. NAVAL MISSIONS AND FORCE PLANNING
1. Summary
The central theme of this section has been that
naval missions provide an operational context for the force
planning process. The operational context links projected
strategic roles with tactical trends. It describes how
forces accomplish their assigned functions. Naval warfare is
fundamentally different than war on land (and similar to war
in the air) . Naval theory simultaneously explains and
accounts for this uniqueness. Missions are based upon and
derived from naval theory. Therefore, a mission orientation
assures that force planning decisions are compatible with
the nature of operations at sea.
Naval missions can be divided into two categories:
peace-keeping and combatant. Although forces cannot be
specifically designed for peace-keeping, that function
influences the planning process. The effectiveness of a
deterrent force is directly related its the combatant
capability. However, combatant features should not
inadvertently undermine deterrence.
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The naval combatant missions are sea control and
power projection. Sea control is the employment of forces to
establish control over an ocean area for the period of time
required to accomplish military objectives. It is relative
with respect to degree, area and time. If one has a
requirement to use the sea extensively, sortie and/or choke-
point control operations are the most effective means to
that end.
Power projection is the exercise of sea control in
order to directly or indirectly influence events ashore. It
is usually associated with operations that breach the
shoreline. However, it also concerns forces operating at sea
that could eventually affect events ashore (e.g. , nuclear
forces; own or adversary's troop transport/supply assets).
Sea control and power projection are directly interrelated.
The capabilities of the ideal naval platform are maximized
for both missions.
2 . Missions and the Future Strategic Environment
In the section on the future strategic environment
at sea, four trends were identified that could affect the
naval role in national military strategy.
* Increased importance of the sea lines of
communications
.
* Increased dependence on forward maritime deployment
as strategy shifts and foreign base access erodes.
* Increased requirement for naval power projection,
especially in support of sea control operations, with a
corresponding increase in risks both at sea and close to
shore.
* Possible increase in pro/anti-SSBN role for general
purpose forces.
Essentially, these trends indicate that the U.S.
will be more dependent upon free use of the seas in the
future. It is also likely that the Navy will have a limited
number of assets in the years ahead. From a mission
perspective, a nation with a strategic requirement to use
the sea extensively but with limited assets available should
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adopt a forward strategy. However, the growth of the Soviet
Navy and the general proliferation of the land-based anti-
ship threat increases the risks associated with forward
deployment. Forces are at risk as soon as they enter key
operating areas.
It is generally not possible to project power
without first establishing some degree of control. The
changing nature of the threat is making sea control more
complicated. Therefore, at least in the near future, the sea
control mission is likely to be of paramount importance. At
a minimum, effective sea control ensures the security of
reinforcements, supplies and nuclear forces at sea. In the
general scheme of a land war, these projection functions are
more important than the over-the-shore naval variety.
In the long-term, however, these trends highlight
what should be a major naval force planning goal.
Specifically, future naval forces should be capable of
operating in an increasingly hostile forward environment.
Moreover, they should have the capability to establish
control and project power ashore simultaneously. An
examination of naval tactical trends could help to identify
some of the systems to be incorporated on future naval
platforms.
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IV. THE TACTICAL CONTEXT; TRENDS IN NAVAL WARFARE
The tactical theories prevailing at any one time will
determine not only the constitution of, fleets but also
the design of the individual warship. 1 -17
Bernard Brodie's observation on tactical theories and
the constitution/design of fleets highlights the central
theme of this section of the study. Decisions on the kinds
of forces to procure are greatly influenced by perceptions
on the nature of naval warfare—the prevailing tactical
theories. Therefore, the planning process should contain a
mechanism to ensure that tactical ideas keep pace with
trends in naval warfare. The discussion which follows is an
attempt to develop such a mechanism, a tactical context for
the planning process. 118
A. INTRODUCTION
It has been shown that projected strategic requirements
should determine future naval roles in national military
strategy. Naval missions operationalize these roles, but
only in broad, general terms. At this stage (i.e., the
tactical level) , the naval force planning challenge is
twofold: (1) to develop force concepts that fulfill
strategic requirements; and (2) to ensure that these
concepts are attuned to the changing nature of naval
warfare.
In many respects, the development of a tactical context
is the most difficult phase of the planning process.
Relative to strategy and missions, the nature of naval
warfare is constantly evolving. Moreover, a force premised
on faulty or outdated ideas may fail miserably in combat.
117 Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944)
,
p^ 265.
118Tactics is defined here as the "use of forces in
battle."
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The objective is to adapt both theory and force structure to
meet the challenges of the future. 119
This is no mean task given the complexity of modern
naval operations. 120 The task is further complicated by the
dual nature of warfare—one's will is directed "at an
animate object that reacts." 121 The efficacy of tactical
theory depends, in part, on the adversary's counter-moves.
Thus, there are inherent uncertainties associated with the
already complex study of tactics. In fact, tactical
uncertainties are so great that the U.S. Navy's sole Vietnam
War ace maintains that "nothing is true in tactics." 122
Brodie concurs: "there is nothing right or wrong but
thinking makes it so applies even to the tactics of fleet
actions." 123 It is doubtful that either Cunningham or
Brodie intended for their comments to discourage tactical
study. 124 Rather, they were probably warning against
adopting an overly rigid approach to the subject. In other
words, there are few, if any, absolutes in tactics.
A basic framework for analysis emerges from the above
discussion. The tactical context for the force planning
process incorporates three elements. First, the general
character of the force concept under review is derived based
119This discussion is not intended to promote change
for change sake; nor does it imply that change is an
absolute requirement. A force based upon the lessons of the
last war is acceptable provided it is capable of fulfilling
future requirements. The important point is to ensure that
force concepts are evaluated in terms of the future, not the
past.
120See James Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," in USNI
Proceedings Maritime Strategy Supplement . January 1986, p.
14 , for a depiction of the complexity of naval operations.




122 Robert Shaw, Fighter Combat (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1985)
,
p. x. Commander Randy "Duke"
Cunningham achieved five victories during the Vietnam War.
123 Brodie, p. 251.
124Cunningham has taught fighter tactics for the past
15 years; Brodie believed tactics "should be a full time
occupation" for naval personnel (p. 247)
.
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upon projected strategic requirements, as refined by
combatant mission considerations. Second, a model is
developed to facilitate tactical analysis. It should be
broad enough in scope to account for the complexities and
uncertainties inherent in naval operations. Finally, the
force concept is evaluated in terms of the model . The
objective is to identify promising avenues down which future
research and development programs might move.
It should be noted at the outset that the discussion
below does not consider all aspects of naval warfare.
Rather, the focus of attention is on the central naval
mission—sea control. 125 As has been shown, there are good
reasons for emphasizing sea control over other facets of
naval warfare. However, this narrow focus necessarily means
that the analysis is incomplete. A different tactical model
would be required to analyze other aspects of naval warfare
(e.g., amphibious assault, commerce raiding, or nuclear
strike)
.
B. FORCE CONCEPT: THE BATTLE FLEET
1. Battle versus Strike Forces
There is a fundamental difference between forces
designed for battle and those designed for strike warfare.
Battle forces combine the capability to concentrate
offensive power against the opposition with the capacity for
sustained defense. 126 Strike forces rely on surprise,
stealth or speed to generate a one way assault against the
opposition. They possess little or no means for defense. 127
The aircraft carrier battle group or surface action group
are examples of battle forces. Submarines, attack aircraft
or missile-carrying patrol craft are examples of strike
forces.
125This includes power projection in support of sea control.
126Lautenschlager, Fall 1983, p. 5.
127 Ibid.
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Obviously, the difference between battle and strike
is one of degree. 128 Most naval units possess elements of
each. In fact, the ideal naval unit would combine a potent
striking potential with the capacity to survive in a hostile
environment. Nonetheless, the distinction is important in
force planning.
The proper balance of units and capabilities within
a naval force depends upon its intended function. 129
Generally, strike-oriented naval forces are instruments of
denial and/or destruction. They can deny to the adversary
the ability to use the seas for its purposes. Alternately,
they can deliver destructive firepower against targets
ashore. Therefore, a strike fleet might best serve the
interests of a country whose objectives include sea
denial. 130
Battle-oriented forces, on the other hand, are
instruments of control and/or influence. Their capacity for
sustained forward operations facilitates establishing
control over large sections of the ocean for other purposes.
Once working control has been secured, it can be exercised
in ways that influence events either at sea or ashore.
Control of the sea means control above, below and on the
surface of the ocean. The surface ship is the only naval
unit capable of sustained operations in all three of these
media. 131 Therefore, the centerpiece of the battle fleet
traditionally has been the capital surface ship. Nations
128Soviet naval theorists also make the distinction
between strike and battle. See Gorshkov, The Sea Power of
the State
,
pp. 224-26; or "The Development of the Art of
Naval Warfare," USNI Proceeding . June 1975, pp. 56-57.
129Lautenschlager, Fall 1983, p. 5; Gorshkov, The Sea
Power of the State , p. 253.
13 For example, the Jeune Ecole, Germany in both wars
and the USSR.
131Four, if one includes space.
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with a requirement to use the sea extensively have usually
opted for the battle fleet. 132
Historically, the choice between battle and strike
forces has not been as clear-cut as is implied above. Battle
fleets are usually more expensive to design, procure, and
operate than are strike forces by virtue of their capability
for sustained offense and defense. Moreover, the ability of
the capital surface ship to operate in all three media also
means that it can be attacked by strike forces optimized for
one. This has led to periodic warnings about the
vulnerability of the battle fleet to less expensive strike
assets. Indeed, a prominent characteristic of 20th Century
naval development has been the ongoing competition between
battle and strike forces. 133 The dominant naval vessel has
been the one that combined state-of-the-art strike assets
with defensive staying power. 134 Attaining and maintaining
that offensive-defensive mix should be the major force
planning goal of the battle fleet nation.
2 . Strategic Requirements
The distinction between battle and strike provides
some perspective on U.S. force planning options. As
previously stated, the choice of what kind of fleet to build
should be governed by its intended function. Several
general conclusions can be drawn about future U.S. naval
functions from the preceding sections on strategical and
operational matters.
132 For example, England, Japan, and the United States.
133This is especially the case in the nuclear era. Many
contend that the destructive power of nuclear weapons
provides the strike fleet with a potentially decisive edge
in the competition. See Gorshkov. The Sea Power of the
State , p. 224. This study rejects that assertion.
134 For example, the battleship, aircraft carrier and,
potentially, the nuclear submarine.
64
* The U.S. will be more dependent on the seas in the
future
;
* Limited availability of naval assets (and other
factors) will necessitate continued maritime forward
deployment;
* The sea-based and land-based threat to U.S. naval
forces will increase; and
* In order., to accomplish strategic objectives at sea
and ashore 1 -35 , U.S. naval forces will require the
capability to establish working control of the sea in
forward regions.
Essentially, future naval forces will be required
to fulfill the functions traditionally accomplished by the
battle fleet—control above, below, and on the surface of
the ocean so that other objectives might be pursued.
Meanwhile, the threat to that fleet continues to grow. The
perceived vulnerability of the present U.S. battle fleet has
caused many to question its future viability. Analyzing how
that fleet functions and the principal threat to it may
reveal some of the force planning issues that should be
addressed in the future.
3 . The Carrier Battle Group
Since the Second World War, the basic unit of the
American battle fleet has been the aircraft carrier battle
group (CVBG) . The scope of naval warfare has so expanded
over the last 50 years that no one ship can function
effectively in any role without the support of others. 136
It is the battle group, not an individual warship, that is
the basic fleet element. 137
This distinction is important and is often
overlooked in the debate about the future of the aircraft
carrier. The value of the carrier to the battle fleet is
135At a minimum, these objectives would include
security of the SLOCs, reinforcements, and nuclear forces
at sea.
136To some extent, this has always been the case; the
battleship required cruisers for scouting and destroyers for
screening. Today, however, the fleet is much more interdependent.
137Lautenschlager, Fall 1983, p. 31.
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directly proportional to the importance of airspace in naval
warfare. As man mastered aerial forms of reconnaissance and
weapons delivery, the role of the carrier grew. However, the
basic structure and purpose of the fleet preceded its rise.
The carrier did not replace existing capabilities, it merely
supplemented them.
Recall that the purpose of the battle fleet is to
establish control above, below and on the surface of the
ocean for other ends. This relationship can be expressed in
terms of three concentric circles emanating outward from the
fleet's operational center as depicted below. 138
Figure 11 Sea Control Zones
138Adapted from Hughes, Fleet Tactics , p. 168
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The area within the circles can be defined as
follows:
* Zone of Control—Working control established;
own forces have relative freedom of action; adversary
operates at great risk.
* Zone of Influence—Disputed control ; own forces
capable of minimum action; both sides operate at risk.
* Zone of Interest—Disputed or enemy working control;
own forces capable of surveillance only.
The zones can be thought of as invisible bubbles that move
with the battle fleet. Their exact dimensions vary over time
as a function of the threat, environmental conditions and
other factors. Obviously, the objective is to expand one's
zone of control at the expense of the adversary.
The warfare tasks associated with sea control can be
divided into four categories; anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
;
anti-surface warfare (ASUW) ; anti-air warfare (AAW) ; and
strike ashore. Figure 12 juxtaposes these tasks with the
units usually designated to accomplish them. 139 The diagram
makes apparent the primary contribution of the carrier
—
expansion of the battle fleet's zones of control, influence
and interest into more distant areas. The oft-cited charge
that the carrier has a monopoly on offensive power applies
only if one regards conventional strike ashore as the
fleet's primary mission. However, if one believes that the
proper mission emphasis is "sea control with a power
projection capability," the current mix seems relatively
balanced. The important point is that the carrier exists to
support the fleet and not vice versa.
139Adapted from James L. Holloway. "The U.S. Navy - A
Functional Appraisal," Oceanus . Summer 1985, p. 6.
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Figure 12 Naval Platforms vs Warfare Tasks
The principal threat to the U.S. battle fleet is the
anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) . The ASCM is the premiere
naval strike weapon of this century. It is based upon the
same principles as the Japanese Kamikaze raids in the waning
days of World War II. The ASCM attempts to overwhelm
opposing defenses through a combination of speed, accuracy
and numbers. When launched from traditional strike platforms
(e.g., the stealthy submarine or speedy aircraft), it is
even more difficult to counter. Finally, the ASCM can be
eguipped with either a standard or nuclear warhead.
The conventional wisdom is that the ASCM has made
the U.S. battle fleet overly vulnerable. It is argued that
the ASCM is the "first weapon of the post-war era that has
the capability to defeat the carrier in a conventional
engagement.
..
[It has] forced the hunter to become the
hunted." 140 Such statements are usually followed by a
reference to the Israeli destroyer ELATH, sunk in 1967 by
140•L ^ UL.P. Brooks, "The Impact of Technology
Structure," USNI Proceedings , February 1981, p. 47.
on Fleet
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Egyptian KOMAR patrol boats firing STYX missiles. 141 More
recently, the example of the HMS SHEFFIELD, sunk by an
EXOCET missile during the Falklands conflict, has been used
to illustrate surface ship vulnerability to the weapon.
There is little doubt that the ASCM presents a
formidable challenge to surface units. Importantly, the
weapon's long range and lethality could decrease the battle
group's zones of control, especially close to land.
However, it is not at all apparent that the threat is
insurmountable. In an article about technology's influence
on naval warfare, Karl Lautenschlager writes of the
historical tendency to overestimate the effectiveness of
strike forces in peacetime. He includes the submarine,
torpedo boat, airplane and anti-ship cruise missile in the
analysis:
[E]very decade or so... it becomes popular to declare
chat the novel weapon can make battle fleets
obsolete. ... £I]n most of these cases, when technology
has been employed to produce a small, inexpensive device
that can sink a capital ship, the mere possibility of
sinking those big ships- is often assumed to make them
immediately obsolete. i4 ^
Lautenschlager ' s point warrants further examination.
The mere fact that ships have been sunk by the weapon does
not make all ships vulnerable. In fact, the sinking of the
ELATH and SHEFFIELD reveals little about the vulnerability
of U.S. battle forces. The ELATH "foolishly appeared within
range of the harbor from which the missiles were fired,
heedless of her position and the possibility of being fired
on." 143 The SHEFFIELD was attrited in the course of
supporting a successful amphibious assault. In peacetime, it
141For example, see U.S. Congress, Joint Senate-House
Armed Services Subcommittee on CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier




142 Lautenschlager, Fall 1983, p. 16.
143Jurgen Rohwer, "Naval Warfare Since 1945," USNI
Proceedings . May 1978, p. 74.
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is often forgotten that naval warfare is attrition-based. 144
While losses should not be dismissed, they still must be
expected. Finally, neither ship was supported by a battle




These examples arbitrarily equate possibility with
probability: what has happened once will always happen.
Lautenschlager stresses that:
Probability, as opposed to theoretical possibility,
brings the operational utility of novel weapons into
question because probability depends on numerous factors
related to the^operational conditions, fleet defenses,
and tactics. X4e>
Thus, it was theoretically possible for Egyptian and Syrian
craft to sink a sizable portion of the Israeli Navy in one
afternoon during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. However,
probability, in the form of skilled Israeli tactics,
thwarted Arab efforts. The Israeli's decoyed or destroyed
all 55 of the longer-range STYX missiles fired at their
forces. They then closed to sink five of the adversary's
ships. 147
4 . Assessment
The purpose of the preceding discussion was to
establish a general frame of reference to facilitate further
tactical analysis. Some of the key issues are summarized
below. An essential element to be considered in determining
144 Hughes, Fleet Tactics , p. 7.
145 In the South Atlantic, the British had no airborne
early warning aircraft. Moreover, HARRIER on station time
was limited to 20 minutes. The HARRIERS performed admirably
under the circumstances, shooting down 31 Argentine
aircraft. However, they by no means achieved control of the
airspace over the operating area.
146Lautenschlager, Fall 1983, p. 16.
147William J. Ruhe, "Anti-Ship Missiles Launch New
10. The
surface
_I) in 1982. Most of the Syrian's highly-
rated Soviet SA-6's were either decoyed or destroyed on the
?round. The IAF then shot down 89 Syrian aircraft, whoseactics relied heavily on the destroyed SAMs.
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the character of a future force is the distinction between
battle and strike. Battle forces are able to engage in
sustained, forward operations by virtue of their combined
capability for offense and defense. An implicit assumption
underlying the battle fleet concept is that destructive
capacity alone is not sufficient to assure control. Strike
forces rely on stealth, speed and/or numbers to generate a
decisive pulse of firepower. In practice, the difference
between the two is a matter of degree.
The decision on whether to develop a battle fleet or
a strike fleet should be based upon its intended function.
Projected U.S. strategic requirements indicate that future
forces will have to fulfill traditional battle fleet
functions. The current U.S. battle fleet consists of 12-15
aircraft carrier battle groups. Each CVBG is capable of
establishing zones of control so that other operations might
be accomplished.
The principal threat to the CVBG is the anti-ship
cruise missile (conventional or nuclear) launched from
surface, subsurface or airborne strike platforms. 148 The
range and lethality of the ASCM threatens forward deployed
battle forces. The weapon presents a formidable challenge to
surface units, as demonstrated by recent naval actions.
However, the evidence from these actions is ambiguous. It
has yet to be determined whether the ASCM will prove to be
more effective than previous strike weapons, whose actual
performance failed to match perceived potential.
Nonetheless, the ASCM is likely to be the major impediment
to battle fleet operations in the future.
Obviously, a central U.S. force planning issue is
whether or not ASCMs have wrought such a dramatic change in
naval warfare as to render the battle fleet obsolete. Based
on the historical record cited above, this study maintains
148The weapon can also be launched from shore facilities.
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that they have not. 149 The prevailing U.S. tactical
theory—a battle fleet of multiple CVBGs— is sound in
relation to U.S. strategic requirements. The perceived
vulnerability of the fleet is more a function of the rise of
an opposing navy that has adroitly exploited (and exported)
new technology than doctrinal flaws.
From 1945 until around 1970, the U.S. Navy enjoyed
almost total freedom of action at sea. 150 The rise of the
Soviet Navy challenged U.S. sea supremacy. The Soviets built
a strike fleet of missile-firing surface, subsurface and
airborne units. This fleet fulfilled their strategic
reguirements of denial at sea and destruction ashore.
Moreover, by choosing this direction of development, they
avoided an analogous response to the U.S. sea-based threat.
Had the Soviets decided to construct a carrier-based battle
fleet, they would have consistently lagged behind U.S.
developments in the field. 151 As a result of their
foresight, the current Soviet Navy presents a fairly
formidable challenge at sea.
During the same period, the lack of substantial
opposition at sea caused the U.S. Navy to focus on over-the-
shore power projection capabilities. The Korean and Vietnam
Wars provided further impetus to pursue this course. In both
those wars and the multiple crises to which forces have
responded since 1945, the fleet has operated with relative
impunity offshore. The net result is that current CVBG
149 See also Hughes, Fleet Tactics . Chapter 4 for an
analysis of how surface units adapted to the last decisive
strike weapon—the airplane. Hughes maintains that by 1944,
surface combatants had "redressed the balance of power they
had lost to naval aircraft." The inability of Japanese
aircraft (except for the Kamikaze raiders) to effectively
penetrate shipboard AAW suites lends credibility to his
conclusion.
150 In 1971, the Soviet Navy counteracted U.S. naval
presence during the Indo-Pakistani War. By the 1973 Yom
Kippur War, the extent of Soviet naval opposition was such




capabilities may be more geared toward unopposed power
projection than opposed war-at-sea operations.
In summary, the prevailing U.S. tactical theory is
sound in relation to strategic requirements. However, it is
viewed to be somewhat lagging with respect to trends in
naval warfare. In order to help fulfill strategic
objectives, the Navy must be capable of sustained, forward
sea control operations. The continued proliferation of the
ASCM could directly challenge its ability to do so. For this
reason, a major U.S. force planning goal should be to
redress the potential imbalance brought on by the ASCM. In
developing future systems and platforms, planners must
strive to attain the optimum offensive-defensive mix that is
essential for a battle fleet to function effectively. The
model presented below suggests one method of conceptualizing
that problem.
C. A TACTICAL MODEL
Any model purporting to simulate naval warfare at the
tactical level must do so at a relatively high degree of
abstraction. Naval combat is a complex process in which
several events usually must occur before the tactical
objective—destruction of the opposing force— is realized.
Fortunately, an abstract model can be useful to the planner
provided it focuses on these events rather than particular
forces. The planner is concerned with developing a network
of systems capable of defeating the adversary in a force-on-
force engagement. The specific capabilities of individual
units are important only to the extent that they contribute
to that overall system. The proper planning perspective is
on total force capability in which, for example, ordnance
delivery capacity is only one aspect.
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In an article about forecasting future naval forces,
Charles D. Allen wrote that:
There are and always have been more far-reaching
linkages that operate across the whole span of naval
warfare and technology. . .
.
[They are] more difficult to
identify, but they, are the key to forecasting the future
shape or the Navy. 1D ^
Allen stressed the importance of analyzing how forces
interact in combat. This analysis would reveal various
linkages which, according to Allen, could aid in the
development of new systems capabilities.
In a recent book titled Fleet Tactics: Theory and
Practice , Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.)
skillfully uncovered these tactical linkages. Hughes wrote
that "the key to fruitful study of tactics is an
appreciation of how battles transpire in time and space." 153
He then proposed several processes to describe the tactical
milieu. In his book, these processes provided a backdrop
for examining historical trends, constants and contexts in
naval warfare. This study contends that Hughes' processes
can also aid in force planning. They accurately describe the
network of functions that the basic naval element should be
capable of performing. 154
1. The Tactical Processes
Naval warfare is attrition-based: "whereas armies
have historically armed and supported man, navies have
essentially manned and supported the arm." 155 Destroy or
neutralize the arm (i.e., the naval vessel) and the tactical
task is complete. Therefore, the first tactical process is
152Charles D. Allen, "Forecasting Future Forces," USNI
Proceedings , November 1982, p. 76.
153Hughes, Fleet Tactics , p. 145.
154Recall that the basic naval el
:VBG, not an individual ship.
155Lautenschlager, Fall 1983, p. 5.
ement is, for example,
the CVB
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firepower ; "the capacity to destroy the enemy's ability to
apply force." 156
In land warfare, geographical factors such as
terrain limit the commander's range of choice on the
disposition and employment of forces. There are few such
restrictions at sea. The uniformity of the ocean surface
(and subsurface/airspace) provides the naval commander with
a wide range of employment options. Therefore, detection and
localization of opposing forces becomes a key tactical task.
This is the process of scouting :
Acts of search, detection, tracking, targeting and enemydamage assessment, including reconnaissance,
surveillance, signals intelligence. .. .Scouting is not




Naval forces must be directed in order to accomplish
their objectives. This is the process of command and control
(C2) . C2 includes assessment of scouting information,
decisions on employment of assets and dissemination of those
decisions. 158 As the focus here is on force planning, a
word of caution about C2 systems is warranted. Clausewitz
wrote that a large part of the information in war is
contradictory, false or of doubtful character: "what is
required of an officer is a certain power of discrimination
which only knowledge of men and things and good judgment can
give." 159 While it is certainly possible to envision
systems to improve the command process, in the final
analysis, the quality of C2 is a function of the commander
and staff.
156Hughes, Fleet Tactics , p. 145.
157 Ibid., p. 288.
158 Ibid., p. 287.
159Clausewitz, p. 162.
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The actions taken by the commander do not occur in a
vacuum. The remaining three processes are the result of
war's dual nature: 160
Counterforce—The capacity to reduce the effect of enemy
firepower. The aggregate of defensive force (hard or
soft kill of weapons) and staying power (capacity to
absorb damage)
.
Antiscoutinq—Actions taken to destroy, diminish or
preclude enemy scouting effectiveness (destroy, deceive,jam or interfere)
.
Command and Control Countermeasures (C2CM) —Actions
taken to defeat or delay the effectiveness of the
enemy's C2
.
Hughes reduced the objective to which all tactical
activity is geared to three words: attack effectively first.
An effective attack is one that eliminates the enemy's
capacity to apply force. To summarize:
A concentration of force against force is always the
best way to grasp the essence of tactics; effective
scouting is the key to delivery of firepower; and C2
directs ... decisions regarding force, counterforce,
scouting and antiscouting measures employed against an
enemy who is taking similar measures to strike
111 d L •
The tactical processes are useful in conceptualizing
future force requirements for two reasons. First, they
account for the dual nature of war. In a force-on-force
engagement, every action is subject to an enemy reaction.
The objective is to maximize one's opportunities to apply
force and to minimize, impede or degrade the opportunities
open to the adversary. It is not sufficient to design a
future unit solely around firepower considerations,
especially if it is to be part of a battle fleet.
Second, the processes are general enough to be
applicable to a wide range of tactical activity. In many
respects, the division of warfare tasks into discrete
categories such as ASW or AAW is dysfunctional. The tendency
160Definitions from Hughes, pp. 287-289.
161Ibid., p. 15.
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is to associate specific units with a particular category
(e.g., a frigate is an ASW platform or the F-14 is an AAW
asset) . Platform capabilities are then maximized for that
warfare task.
However, the measure of effectiveness of an
individual platform is its overall contribution to the
battle group. Perhaps a more prudent approach to planning
would be to design forces around the concepts that guide
their employment. In combat, forces act as an interdependent
network of systems controlled by the battle group commander.
The key word here is "systems." For example, the F-14, AEGIS
cruiser and shipboard point defense missiles form one type
of counterforce system. Based on information from his
scouting system, the tactical commander employs these assets
to diminish the effect of enemy firepower. While performing
the counterforce role, these units may also contribute to
the scouting, antiscouting and firepower systems. The
important point is that, in combat, most units are capable
of performing a range of activities that transcend
traditional warfare categories. The individual responsible
for making the whole operation mesh is the battle group
commander. He is concerned with total capability: the
synergistic effect of properly employed subsystems from
various platforms. In this view, forces should be planned
from the perspective of the battle group commander. Hughes'
tactical processes are much more representative of how a
commander views the battle than are specific warfare
categories.
2 . The Engagement Time Line
The second half of the tactical force planning model
is the engagement time line. Whereas the tactical processes
describe the various activities that may occur during a
force-on-force encounter, the engagement time line arranges
these activities into a logical sequence of events. This is















Figure 13 Engagement Time Line
There are several limitations to the engagement time
line. First, the diagram only shows one side of the action.
Obviously, the adversary has its own line. Second, actions
taken by the adversary to impede our movement along the line
are not depicted. Finally, the figure represents a snapshot
in time. It only illustrates one engagement during one
particular period of time. In reality, the tactical
environment would be characterized by multiple engagements
progressing at various rates along the line against an
adversary attempting the same.
Despite these limitations, it is possible to
visualize a tactical encounter using the model. Bearing in
mind once again that this is a static depiction, the
activity that occurs between "a" and "b" is scouting and
antiscouting. Own forces are taking actions to detect, track
and target the opposition; they are also attempting to
impede the adversary's targeting process. The
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scouting/antiscouting phase concludes when the information
is received by C2
.
C2 and C2CM activities occur between "b" and "c".
The mass of information obtained by scouts must be filtered
through the assessment-decision-direction loop. Decisions
must be made and promulgated on whether to continue
monitoring or to engage the target. Moreover, after initial
and/or subseguent engagement, an assessment must be made on
whether or not the contact has been eliminated. The C2/C2CM
phase is by far the most complicated part of the engagement.
C2 is affected both by counter-measures aimed at the command
process and, indirectly, by antiscouting and counterforce
measures aimed at reconnaissance, targeting and firepower
assets.
Firepower and counterforce activities occur between
"c" and "d." The effectiveness of firepower is a function of
weapon range, speed, accuracy and lethality. Protection
against firepower is afforded by counterforce, the aggregate
of defensive force and staying power. Defensive force
attempts to eliminate either the platform, prior to weapon
release, or the weapon, prior to impact. Staying power is a
measure of survivability after absorbing hits. Given the
lethality of modern weapons, the trend since the late 1950'
s
has been to emphasize defensive force over staying power. It
should be noted that the engagement is not over at weapons
release or even at impact. Some means must be available to
assess damage so that a re-attack may be directed if
reguired.
The model establishes the objective: to reach point
"d" before the adversary. More importantly, however, it
illustrates that there are numerous ways to improve one's
ability to achieve this objective. While "ordnance on
target" is the overriding goal, the means to attain it are
more varied than simply building bigger or better bombs.
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For example, one alternative might be to design
systems that reduce the time reguired to accomplish each
process: longer range scouting/firepower systems or C2
systems that process data faster. Another possibility could
be systems that combine two or more processes—what the
Soviets have recently labelled as "reconnaissance-strike
complexes." 162 A third option might be systems designed to
lengthen the adversary's time line via the antiscouting,
C2CM or counterforce processes. The possibilities are
legion and limited only by the imagination. The model aids
in the conceptualization process by framing the problem in
its entirety.
3. Utility of the Model
The utility of this tactical model is that it
approximates the events that occur during an actual
engagement. Moreover, it gives due consideration to all of
the processes that contribute to attaining the tactical
objective. It crosses various warfare specialty lines and
depicts the problem in much the same manner as a tactical
commander might look at it. The reason why this kind of
approach is considered important in force planning is
outlined below.
The basic content of national military strategy,
especially as it applies to naval forces, has not varied
greatly since World War II. As was shown in the section on
projected strategic reguirements, this trend is likely to
continue. Essentially, the U.S. will reguire a battle fleet
capable of forward sea control operations for the
foreseeable future. At the same time, fiscal constraints and
the escalating cost of shipbuilding will no doubt limit the
162These systems have the capability to detect, track,
target, engage and assess damage almost simultaneously. The
Soviet concern is with the Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System (JSTARS) , the Joint Tactical Missile System
(JTACMS) and the Precision Location Strike System (PLSS)
,
all under development as part of the AIRLAND Battle concept.
See Ramon Lopez, "The AIRLAND Battle 2000 Controversy,"
International Defense Review . November 1983, p. 1551-1556.
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future size of the combatant Navy to between 200-300 ships
and 1000-2000 aircraft. Given constrained resources and
relatively stable strategic requirements, the most
important naval force planning task will be to maximize the
capabilities of the systems on board this fixed number of
platforms.
The efficacy of a particular strategy is determined
by the war-fighting qualities of the forces that support it.
The efficacy of the forces is determined by their ability to
function as a coherent unit and defeat the adversary.
Therefore, it follows that naval force planning should be
guided by the same considerations that govern how the forces
will be employed. In a recent Naval War College Review
article, Frank Uhlig commented on the impact that long-range
sensors and weapons have had on naval tactics:
The tactician of today must. . .widen his horizons to
those of his sensors and his weapons. It is they, more
often than his ships, that he must manipulate. Assuming
forces of similar power, the commander who best does
this is the one likely to win. 1 *3 -5
If today's tactician must adopt a "systems" approach in
order to effectively fight his forces, then so too should
those responsible for future force planning. This study
maintains that the tactical model presented above is well-
suited to that end.
D. APPLICATION TO THE FORCE CONCEPT
It was previously determined that the force concept to
guide future planning would be a battle fleet capable of
sustained, forward operations. Because the U.S. has global
interests and responsibilities, that fleet would be
subdivided into a specific number of semi-autonomous battle
groups (or task forces) . Each group or force would be
capable (with assistance from others in particularly hostile
163 Frank Uhlig, "Naval Tactics: Examples and
Analogies," Naval War College Review . March-April 1981, p.
104.
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areas) of forward engagement of the adversary's naval and
air assets to accomplish its assigned mission. 164 Fleet
operations would be conducted in support of one or more of
the projection purposes previously described. The exact
purpose (s) would depend upon the circumstances of the war.
It is no coincidence that this force concept is similar
to the existing structure of the fleet. Strategic
reguirements , tempered by operational considerations,
dictate that U.S. naval forces be capable of attaining
maritime superiority over any potential adversary. The
current and projected future mix of surface, subsurface and
air assets provides the basic ingredients to that end. The
rise of the Soviet Navy, with the accompanying proliferation
of long-range anti-ship missiles, has not wrought such a
dramatic change in naval warfare as to warrant scrapping
U.S. naval doctrine. However, these factors do indicate that
a reorientation in planning may be necessary. In the future,
the in-house force planning debate should not be over
specific platforms. Rather, the focus should be on
tactically integrating new and existing systems on and
among proven platforms.
The following discussion examines some possible
directions for future research and development. As the focus
of this study has been on proposing a framework for force
planning, the analysis is by no means either comprehensive
or in-depth. Although these ideas are subdivided by process,
the planning objective would be to integrate them into an
interactive network of systems. Finally, in ascertaining the
proper mix of systems, planners would do well to recall that
the difference between the offense and defense in naval
warfare is determined by the objective. If one desires a
battle fleet capable of forward offensive operations, then
164This does not mean that a battle group would
necessarily rush forward at the outbreak of hostilities.
However, it does mean that forces should be capable of
eventually operating forward as the enemy is driven back.
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that fleet should also be configured for sustained defense.
Though often neglected in the past, counterforce
,
antiscouting and C2CM systems are likely to be increasingly
important in the future.
1. Firepower
Firepower considerations are usually well
represented in the force planning process. However, one
issue related to future developments is worth noting—the
relationship between quality and quantity in weapon systems.
Advances in propulsion and guidance technologies continue to
increase the range, accuracy and lethality of modern missile
systems. Current trends indicate that future systems may
incorporate some of the following concepts:
* Multiple sensor weapons for guidance redundancy and
resistance to countermeasures (e.g., a radar, infrared,
optical mix)
;
* Autonomous missile guidance systems to facilitate
"launch and leave" tactics and highly precise strikes;
* Conversion of aircraft from a close-in strike asset
to a stand-off delivery platform;
* Low observable (Stealth) missiles; and
* Non-projectile weapons based on laser technology or
other physical principles.
To the extent that these systems improve overall firepower
capability they should (and will) be pursued. However, high
quality systems exact a price that the planner should not
overlook.
State-of-the-art weapon systems usually come at a
high unit cost. This not only means that fewer numbers are
affordable, but also that the net cost of a system may
eventually exceed the value of its target. Furthermore,
modern missiles have a relatively short half-life. Improved
versions often reach the testing stage even before an
existing model is fully integrated in the fleet. The
combination of high unit cost and short half-life provides
little incentive to stockpile existing models in large
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quantities. In the long run, fleet magazines could contain a
dangerously low number of the very best missiles.
Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, history illustrates
that the victor in war is the winner of the last salvo, not
the first.
The planner naturally consults the future for
firepower solutions. Nonetheless, he should never forget
that a future fleet may be called on one day to fight.
Modernization should be balanced with readiness, both
present and future. One possibility for improving net
firepower capability might be adopting a Hi-Lo mix of
weapons:
* Balance state-of-the-art with lower quality systems;
* Design weapons for longevity even at the expense of
capability;
* Ensure new platforms are compatible with older
weapons; and
* Keep "out-dated" systems active (e.g., guns or earlier
model missiles)
Regardless of how the quality versus quantity issue
is resolved, the firepower process will probably receive the
majority of the planner's attention. However, it is only
one of the factors that contributes to total force
capability.
2 . Scouting
Scouting has always been one of the most important
aspects of naval warfare. Its importance is likely to
increase in the future. Modern weapons have the potential to
place forces at risk at unprecedented ranges. Capitalizing
on that potential, however, requires scouting systems
capable of detecting, tracking and targeting the adversary
at even greater ranges. This information must also be
delivered to C2 in a timely manner for it to be tactically
significant. Given weapons of equal capability, even a
small scouting advantage could be decisive.
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Lautenschlager contends that the next major
evolutionary change in naval warfare will be the result of
improvements in scouting systems. He believes that the
proper mix of sensors will make possible the "tactical
integration of the oceans." 165 From a practical standpoint,
however, fully realizing this goal could take years of
development. Moreover, the cost of such a system might
exceed its tactical value.
A more feasible planning objective might be to seek
tactical integration of the battle group's zone of control
or influence. Such a system would require a wide range of
scoutina platforms equipped with multiple and redundant
sensors. 166 Platforms would include all battle group
assets, but with emphasis on off-board units such as
aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles, satellites and
towed/anchored arrays. While on-board systems would still be
equipped with emitting sensors (e.g. , radar and sonar) , the
long range goal would be a passive-sensor fleet (e.g.,
infrared, optical and electronic sensing) . On-board passive
data could then be collated with off-board active
information. The objective would be to establish a scouting
system capable of detecting, tracking and targeting any
adversary movement (including weapon launch) within the
group's zone of control. At the same time, the use of
passive sensors on surface platforms would help to deny
similar information to the opponent.
3. C2
It is almost impossible to discuss scouting
improvements without including the C2 process in the
analysis. Information collected but unusable is worthless.
165Lautenschlager, Fall 1983, p. 6.
166 In the past, the Navy has had great success
improving scouting capabilities simply by adding existing
inexpensive sensors onto fleet platforms. Airborne examples
include the Forward Looking Infrared System (FLIR) on attack
and ASW aircraft and the Television Camera System (TSC) on
fighter aircraft.
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Future C2 systems must be capable of integrating large
amounts of diverse data and presenting it in a manner that
facilitates timely tactical decisions. Candidate
technologies include advanced computer-based data processing
systems incorporating artificial intelligence subroutines.
Research and development in this field is progressing
rapidly. For example, it is now feasible to match a discrete
infrared, radar or sonar signature to a specific platform.
These and other new systems could afford a commander the
ability to ascertain the exact composition, direction of
movement and hostile actions (i.e., weapon launch) of
opposing forces at greatly increased distances.
An area of particular concern in the future should
be the "direction" stage of the C2 process. Communications
systems must be capable of securely and accurately relaying
information even in the presence of enemy countermeasures.
Based on the assumption that it is not feasible for the
adversary to jam every freguency simultaneously, it is
possible to envision anti-jam radio and data-link systems
that automatically switch to a clear circuit at a certain
threshold of interference. Another most important area for
development is a reliable ship-to-submarine and submarine-
to-submarine communications system.
Although new hardware and software may improve the
assessment and direction stages, the effectiveness of the C2
process ultimately depends on the decision-maker and his
staff. The future commander's role will be more complicated,
not less. He must understand how these high-technology
systems function. He must ensure that machine output does
not replace human judgment. Finally, if the systems fail or
are subjected to enemy countermeasures, the commander must




Soviet military theorists often write of the
dialectical relationship between the offense and defense. At
any particular period in time, one may appear to dominate
the other. This often results in a flurry of activity to
redress or even tip the balance toward what was the weaker
of the two. Unfortunately, it is difficult in peacetime to
accurately assess the status of the relationship.
This study contends that the ASCM has the potential
to seriously impede battle fleet operations in the future.
It also argues that the U.S. would have great difficulty
fulfilling strategic reguirements without a battle fleet.
Therefore, force planners should devote increased attention
to developing systems to counter or defeat the ASCM
threat. 167 It is said that the best defense is a well
directed fire from our own guns. Though this be true, in the
age of 300-plus mile missiles, some of our fire may have to
be redirected at weapons rather than platforms.
Modern radar technology is rapidly approaching the
scan, freguency and processing rates necessary to reliably
track and target even the most capable tactical missiles.
Moreover, future hypersonic missiles will be able to
outperform their guarry in all phases of the intercept.
Nonetheless, designing a missile to target another missile
is not a long-term solution to this problem.
Just as firepower systems are evolving toward the
non-projectile weapon, so too must counterforce. Initially,
in fact, this technology might be best employed as a
counterforce system. Current lasers have demonstrated the
capability to shoot down airborne drone targets. Coupled
with a high-speed fire control system, the laser might prove
to be an effective anti-missile defense.
167The deployment of AEGIS was a major step in this
direction. That missiles are the primary mode of nuclear
weapons delivery should provide an added incentive to pursue
this course.
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The final counterforce issue concerns staying power.
Current trends indicate that many future weapons will be
precision-guided with conventional warheads. It may be the
time to readdress the question of ship survivability.
Studies could be commissioned to determine if armor plating
significantly diminishes the effect of anti-ship missiles.
New composite materials might be developed that offer armor
protection without a corresponding weight penalty. Given
precision guidance, it seems likely that the probability of
a missile impacting certain parts of a ship would be higher
than in other areas. If such a correlation does exist, the
more vulnerable sections could be reinforced with
conventional or perhaps even reactive armor. 168
5 . Antiscouting
There are two kinds of antiscouting
—
passive and
active. Passive antiscouting denies the adversary
information through emission control and similar measures.
Contrary to popular myth, it is still possible to move
covertly on the surface of the ocean, radar and satellite
surveillance systems notwithstanding. A ship travelling a 25
knots can be anywhere in an area of 54 square miles after 10
minutes, 490 square miles after 30 minutes. 169 However, a
ship emitting electronic energy is easier to detect. For
this reason, passive scouting sensors also function as
anti-scouts. While a totally passive-sensor fleet is
probably not feasible, future active systems should be
located off-board or operate in short bursts.
Active antiscouting attacks the material base of
modern weapons and sensors—the electromagnetic spectrum.
The objective is to lengthen or disrupt the enemy's
engagement time line by jamming, interfering, deceiving or
168Reactive armor is used to counter anti-tank weapons.
The armor is bolted on the vulnerable areas of a tank. When
struck, the reactive armor explodes outward, destroying the
weapon.
169Lautenschlager, Fall 1983, p. 47.
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destroying its scouting or firepower systems. Commonly
called electronic warfare (EW) , active antiscouting is an
underdeveloped process. This is because it is difficult to
gage the effectiveness of EW short of actual war. However,
the recent experiences of the Israeli's in 1973 and 1982 and
U.S. forces off Libya in 1986 indicate that properly
employed EW can have a decisive impact on the outcome of
operations.
It is difficult to classify specific systems as
anti-scouts (the exceptions are the EA-6B aircraft, anti-
radiation missiles (ARM) and chaff-like expendables)
.
Perhaps the proper planning focus is simply to recognize the
crucial importance of this process in war. This would ensure
that antiscouting capability be considered in the design of
every unit.
Finally, as every fighter pilot knows, the highest
priority targets after the outbreak of hostilities are the
adversary's reconnaissance aircraft. At some point, planners
will have to consider developing a weapon to counter a
reconnaissance craft that currently operates with
impunity—the satellite.
6. C2CM
All of the aforementioned processes can be employed
against the adversary's C2 . Scouting targets it.
Antiscouting deceives it. Firepower destroys it.
Counterforce confounds its battle damage expectations. How
well we counter the adversary's command process is a direct
function of the quality of our own. To be most effective,
C2CM should be centrally controlled. It is one thing to
inadvertently deceive the enemy. It is quite another to
deceive him, know what he is seeing and then exploit this
opportunity.
Forces can only be designed for C2CM indirectly. The
planner's concern is with providing units the capability to
perform all of the other processes effectively. Each process
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contributes to the total capability of the force. This
solves one-half of the problem. The second half—how well
the forces are actually employed—can only be determined
later. In the final analysis, effective C2CM is the end
toward which all actions in war should be directed:
The object in war is to exercise control over the enemy
by reducing the enemy to a state where he is neither
able to prosecute effective warfare operations nor
willing to resist. This control can be exercised either
through the destruction of the enemy's military





The purpose of this section of the study was to develop
a tactical context for the force planning process. The
tactical context is the third and final part of this theory
of naval strategic planning. Projected strategic
reguirements determine future naval roles in national
military strategy. Operational considerations impart meaning
to these roles by analyzing them in terms of naval theory
and missions. At the tactical level, the planning challenge
is twofold: (1) to develop force concepts that fulfill
strategic reguirements; and (2) to ensure that these
concepts are attuned to the changing nature of naval
warfare.
The tactical context consists of three parts: derivation
of the force concept; development of a tactical model; and
application of the model to the concept.
1. Derivation of the Force Concept
Strategical and operational considerations guide the
derivation of the force concept. The distinction between
battle and strike provides some perspective on planning
options. Projected U.S. strategic reguirements dictate that
future forces be capable of fulfilling traditional battle
fleet functions—control above, below and on the surface of
170Gene E. Layman, "C3CM—A Warfare Strategy," Naval
War College Review . March-April 1985, p. 33.
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the ocean to facilitate other ends. Naval theory informs us
that these functions necessitate integral surface,
subsurface and air assets capable of sustained, forward
operations.
The basic element of the U.S. fleet since the Second
World War has been the aircraft carrier battle group. The
CVBG is capable of establishing zones of control, influence
and interest in its area of operations. These zones can be
employed to support projection tasks elsewhere (by tying
down enemy forces) or as a base for CVBG power projection.
The CVBG is the force concept selected to guide future
development.
The principal threat to the U.S. battle fleet is the
anti-ship cruise missile launched from traditional strike
platforms. The range, accuracy and lethality of the ASCM
could severely impede CVBG operations in the future. A





The tactical model aids in force planning by
identifying and ordering the factors that describe the
tactical milieu. It simultaneously accounts for the dual
nature of warfare and depicts the problem in much the same
manner as a tactical commander might view it. The
centerpiece of the model is Hughes' tactical processes:
firepower, scouting, command and control, counterforce,
antiscouting, and command and control countermeasures. When
coupled with the engagement time line, these processes can
be useful in conceptualizing force planning options.
3 Application of the Model
Constrained resources and relatively stable
strategic requirements are likely to limit the future size
of the Navy. Therefore, the focus of force planning should
be on tactically integrating new and existing systems on and
among a fixed number of platforms. The model aids in this
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process by depicting the tactical problem in its entirety
(i.e., both offense and defense; own and adversary's
forces) . It provides a basic framework for analyzing the
utility of future systems in terms of total force
capability.
4 . Conclusion
In assessing the future of naval warfare, Hubert





* Search, Reconnaissance and Antiscouting;
* Electronic and Acoustic Warfare;
* Missile Technology;
* Active and Passive Sensing Systems; and
* Anti-Missile Systems
As these trends indicate, naval warfare has progressed to
the point where systems and the integration of systems are
more important than platforms. The measure of effectiveness
of a platform is its contribution to total force capability.
If we desire to fight our forces as a battle group, then we
should also plan them from that perspective. Adopting a





The purpose of this study was to propose a theory of
naval strategic planning for programming. The objective was
to identify and describe those factors that should influence
how the Navy plans for its long-range future. A central
and underlying theme was that, given an increasingly hostile
environment at sea, there is a "need to establish a more
common ground between tactical thought and strategic
planning." 172 This could be accomplished, it was argued, by
adopting a three-pronged approach to the planning process:
future force requirements would be determined based upon
strategical, operational and tactical considerations.
The focus of the work was on in-house naval planning.
For this reason, the study is incomplete. Recall that a
distinction was made early-on regarding the "measures
required to sell a program and those that led to its
development in the first place." This study has emphasized
the latter. In doing so, it has neglected an important (but
hopefully not overriding) variable in the strategic planning
equation: the political context. The political context
concerns matters relating to how the Navy articulates its
requirements within the Executive department and to the
Congress. The author believes that the approach outlined
herein might also prove useful in the political arena.
However, the issue was not directly addressed. 173 With this
point in mind, some general conclusions are considered
below.
172Hughes, Naval War College Review , p. 17.
173 Future research might focus on the political
context. An excellent case study would be a comparison
between Sea Plan 2000 and the Maritime Strategy. Although
separated only by four years and based upon similar
assumptions, the latter was successful, at least in part,
because of political reasons.
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1. Naval Strategic Planning
The central objective of the naval strategic
planning process is to provide future forces with the
capability necessary to support projected strategic
requirements. As a non-aggressor nation, the United States
cannot predict with any certainty the character, scope,
duration or location of a future war. Nonetheless, the
efficacy of our strategy is directly dependent upon the
present and future capabilities of the forces that support
it. It therefore follows that, within the broad context of
national military strategy, the naval planning process
should focus upon force capabilities. In essence, naval
strategic planning is future force planning. It should be






The strategic context describes how the maritime
component of national power fits into the overall structure
of U.S. strategy. It provides the basic framework from which
naval-related strategic requirements can be projected. The
relative importance of maritime power is determined by
juxtaposing the six uses of the sea (i.e., prevent or secure
usage for transport, resources or projection) with national
interests and objectives. This establishes the rationale
underlying naval roles in national military strategy. It is
then possible to project future requirements based upon
changes in the uses of the sea, national military strategy
and naval roles in that strategy respectively. The objective
is to articulate, in general terms, what roles future naval
forces will be required to perform. This study projected
that the role of maritime forward deployment will be
increasingly important in the future, while the risks




The operational context links projected strategic
roles with the tactical trends in naval warfare. It
describes how forces accomplish their assigned functions. It
is based upon a sound understanding of the naval combatant
missions—sea control and power projection. Naval warfare
is fundamentally different from war on land (and similar to
air warfare) . Naval theory, from which the missions are
derived, simaltaneously explains and accounts for this
uniqueness. Therefore, a mission orientation assures that
force planning decisions are compatible with the nature of
operations at sea.
From a planning perspective, the most crucial (and
often overlooked) aspect of naval theory is that sea control
and power projection are directly interrelated. 174 One is
rarely possible without the other in the modern maritime
environment. Given U.S. strategic requirements, geographic
position and limited naval assets, theory informs us that
future forces should have the capability to establish
working control of the sea in forward areas. This would help
to ensure the security of reinforcements, supplies and
nuclear projection forces at sea (i.e., sea control in
support of power projection) . In order to operate forward,
however, forces also require the capability to project power
ashore (i.e., power projection in support of sea control).
Sea control and power projection are complementary
capabilities. The ideal naval fleet incorporates units
optimized for both.
4 The Tactical Context
The tactical context provides a means to evaluate
future force concepts in terms of the tactical milieu. This
kind of analysis helps to ensure that the concept is both
174Recall that power projection includes nuclear
strike, movement of reinforcements/supplies, commerceinterdiction. amphibious landing, and naval
gunfire/missile/tactical air support.
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capable of fulfilling strategic requirements and attuned to
the changing nature of naval warfare. It is based upon the
assumption that, because tactical considerations guide force
employment options, they should also be influential in the
force planning process.
Strategic reguirements, tempered by operational
factors, dictate that future U.S. naval forces be capable of
fulfilling traditional battle fleet functions. This study
does not foresee a situation within the next several decades
that would warrant changing the basic character of the U.S.
fleet. The current balance of forces—a surface, subsurface
and sea-based air mix— is compatible with both strategical
and operational considerations. In the presence of a growing
threat at sea, however, the tactical context of planning
will become increasingly important in the future.
The model developed in the previous section suggests
one method for conceptualizing the tactical environment. It
provides a means to evaluate future concepts in terms of
total capability (i.e., both offense and defense; own and
adversary's actions). Naval warfare has progressed to the
point where systems and the integration of systems are more
important than individual platforms. Success or failure in
a future naval engagement will depend upon the ability of
individual units to function as a coherent whole. Capability
in this area can be improved through training and, as this
study contends, force planning. The U.S. Navy routinely
deploys and operates its forces in their basic fighting
formations. 175 This kind of training should impart an
initial advantage over an adversary that does not operate in
this manner. That advantage could be heightened by ensuring
that the same factors which govern force employment are more
fully considered in the force planning process.
175With the possible exception of multi-CVBG operations.
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The first task of planning is to guide an
organization into an uncertain future. It must identify
those factors which can be used to determine future force
requirements. The resultant concepts can then be further
developed as required by the organization's overall needs.
The theory presented herein suggests one method for
conceptualizing those requirements. It argues that the focus
of naval planning should be total force capability. As the
U.S. Navy approaches the 21st Century, the tactical
integration of various platform capabilities into a coherent
fighting system should be a major force planning goal.
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